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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Determining the Adequacy of Representation
in a Class Action
According to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, it is
possible for a single representative to represent adequately a class of be-
tween three and four million members. The court in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin' held that a determination of the adequacy of representation
in a class action brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure2 should not hinge on quantitative elements.
Plaintiff, an odd-lot4 investor on the New York Stock Exchange,
brought a class action on behalf of himself and about 3.7 million other
odd-lot investors against odd-lot dealers Carlisle & Jacquelin and De-
Coppet & Doremus,5 and against the Exchange. Alleging that the two
firms conspired together to monopolize odd-lot trading and to fix the
odd-lot differential at an excessive rate in violation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act,' and that the Exchange failed its statutory duty under the
Securities Exchange Act of 19347 to adopt rules protecting odd-lot in-
vestors, he sought treble damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff was
the sole representative of the class in the action; his damages were es-
timated at seventy dollars.8
The trial court dismissed the action as to the class, holding that
plaintiff, as "sole representative" with only a "miniscule" interest, could
'391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Medina, J.).2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For an extensive treatment of the law regarding class
actions, see 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 561-72 (Rules ed. 1961, Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTzOFF];
3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01 to .24 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE].
2 391 F.2d at 563.
'The normal unit of trade on the exchange, usually 100 shares, is called a
"round-lot"; the term "odd-lot" refers to transactions involving fewer than the
full round-lot unit. Odd-lots are purchased through odd-lot dealers who charge a
per-share fee, called a differential, for their services. See C. ROSENBERG, STOCK
MARKET PRIMER 22-23 (1962).
' The two defendant firms handle about 99 percent of the odd-lot business on
the New York Stock Exchange. 391 F.2d at 559. For information regarding
odd-lot trading practices on which this suit is based, see SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, PT. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
171-202 (1963).
815 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
S15 U.S.C. §§ 78(f)(b), 78(f)(d) & 78(s)(a) (1964).
' 391 F.2d at 564 n.8.
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not represent it fairly and adequately as required by the rule.' The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,"0 holding that "reliance on
quantitative elements to determine adequacy of representation, as was
done by the District Court, is unwarranted."" It noted that newly
amended Rule 23 had received "somewhat less than an enthusiastic re-
ception in the District Courts,"' 2 and called for a more liberal interpre-
tation:
If we have to rely on one litigant to assert the rights of a large class
then rely we must. The dismissal of the suit out of hand for lack of
proper representation in a case such as this is too summary a proce-
dure and cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the new
rule.'3
The court observed that if Eisen were not allowed to bring the suit
as a class action, it was unlikely the claim could be litigated at all. It
reasoned that no odd-lot investor "would have sustained sufficient dam-
ages to warrant, as a practical matter, individual prosecution of his
claim."' 4 Defendants argued that a successful antitrust plaintiff could
collect reasonable attorneys fees despite his small damages, and thus
could individually seek a recovery. But the court regarded the possi-
bility of a significant award for counsel as too remote to make feasible
this method of pursuing the claim. 5
'Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). While holding
that "[t]his alone is enough for this court to make a determination that this
action cannot be maintained as a class action," the court gave other reasons:
plaintiff could not give the required notice because of financial prohibitions;
questions common to the class did not predominate over questions affecting in-
dividual members; fair and proper management of the suit likely would be impos-
sible. Id. at 150.
" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction and remanded
the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing "on the questions of
notice, adequate representation, effective administration of the action and any
other matters which the District Court may consider pertinent and proper." 391
F.2d at 570.
1 391 F.2d at 563.
1 For an example of "less than an enthusiastic reception" to the new rule, see
School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001
(1967), where the court's disenchantment with the rule is readily apparent:
Such a radical extension by [sic] this Court's jurisdiction by the mere in-
action of a non-appearing, non-resident citizen is, in our view, unprece-
dented. . . . We have some doubt, too, of the propriety of a rule which
extends the binding, substantive effect of a judgment to absent, but 'de-
scribed,' class members as well as to 'identified' class members.
Id. at 1005.
12391 F.2d at 563.
"Id. at 566.
'
5 Id. In a prior ruling that the trial court's dismissal of the class action in
Eisen was an appealable order, the court of appeals had held: "We can safely
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A small claimant such as Eisen is therefore limited, for all practical
purposes, to asserting his rights only through a class action. An analysis
of the typical case of this kind indicates that reliance on quantitative
standards for determining the adequacy of representation would prohibit
his use of this device also, thus entirely precluding him from litigating
his claim. In the small claimant situation, the wrongful conduct usually
causes minor individual damages to a large number of people. Since
each individual's interest is small, there is normally little enthusiasm for
attempting to vindicate the claims through a class action or otherwise.
Should some claimants attempt to bring such an action, they would
likely be few in number'6 and the amount of their interest would be rela-
tively insignificant.
There is a need then to provide the small claimant with some remedy.1 7
One of the avowed functions of the class action device is to "provide
small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which
would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation."" Reli-
ance on quantitative factors, however, precludes the use of the class ac-
tion by the small claimant thereby defeating a primary purpose of the
rule.
The general question of adequacy of representation in a class action
has assumed particular importance since the adoption of new Rule 23
in 1966. Eisen qualified for class litigation under subsection (b) (3) of
the new rule,'" which corresponds to the former "spurious" class action."
assume that no lawyer of competence is going to undertake this complex and
costly case to recover $70 for Mr. Eisen." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370
F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). The court in
the present action regarded this earlier finding that a class action was Eisen's
only remedy as "law of this case" and binding upon it. 391 F.2d at 567. For an
argument similar to the one made by defendants here-and a similar result-see
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
10 391 F.2d at 563.
'
7 See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); see generally Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contempo-
rary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHaI. L. REv. 684 (1941).
18 391 F.2d at 560. See also the comments in Advisory Committee's Note, 39
F.R.D. at 104 (1966).
" To bring a class action under new Rule 23 all the factors in section (a) of
the rule must be present:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition, at least one of the prerequisites listed in sec-
tion (b) must be met. Subsection (b) (3) arises when "the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
19691
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Adequacy of representation was not considered crucial under the old
rule, since it was generally held that the spurious action was merely a
permissive joinder device and only those actually before the court were
bound by the judgment.21 However, under the amended Rule 23, all
members of the (b) (3) class are bound unless they request exclusion.2
Further, due process requires that absentee class members not be bound
unless they were adequately represented in the action.2" Thus, under the
new rule adequate representation of the class is required in all actions,
not only by the rule's own terms, 4 but also by this constitutional con-
sideration.
Courts in the past have looked at various factors to determine whether
or not representation of a class was adequate. 5 These included: (1)
whether the interests of the representatives conflicted with the interests
of the class;" (2) whether the likelihood of collusion was eliminated
so far as possible ;27 (3) whether the number of representatives was suf-
ficient as compared to the numerical size of the class;28 and (4) whether
the representatives' self-interest in the suit was substantial.2"
There are two distinct quantitative factors that can be singled out
from these traditional standards: (1) the number of representatives as
compared to the numerical size of the class, and (2) the amount of the
representatives' self-interest in the suit. In Eisen neither the district
court nor the court of appeals made any clear differentiation between these
two concepts, although each court apparently took both into account."
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy." Id. at 23(b) (3).
2 Under the former rule, the "spurious" category arose "when the character
of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is .. . several, and
there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a com-
mon relief is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 28 U.S.C. App. (1964). Com-
pare current FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
"See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B).
"See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
,FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
See generally 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 567; 3A MOORE 23.07.
"6 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) ; Anderson v. Moorer, 372
F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967).
"'See, e.g., P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 25 F.R.D. 264
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
"See, e.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Trac. Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940).
"See Aalco Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Laundry Linen & Towel Chauffeurs
& Helpers Union, 115 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App. 1938).
"The district court's language shows the two concepts intertwined:
Eisen's inadequacy as a representative of the asserted class is further under-
[Vol. 47
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These quantitative standards are not ends in themselves, but logically
may be viewed as objective indices that the more fundamental require-
ments of adequate representation are present. The number of repre-
sentatives as compared to the size of the class provides some evidence
that diverse interests among the class members are represented before
the court; the amount of the representatives' self-interest can reasonably
be viewed as a factor in guarding against collusion among the litigants.
Elimination of the use of quantitative factors will probably make
more difficult the task of determining adequate representation, but it
should not be allowed to detract from the fundamental criteria of such
representation. Indeed, although the court of appeals discarded the
quantitative tests, it retained the underlying elements they represented.
It made clear that a determination should still be made as to whether
plaintiff's claim is typical and his interests not antagonistic to those
of the remainder of the class, and whether the likelihood of collusion has
been eliminated so far as possible."- In addition, it suggested "that the
party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct
the proposed litigation."32 This consideration appears to be in keeping
with the court's practical approach to the problem: it was the attorney,
and not the plaintiff, who would in fact represent the interests of the
class in court. It has been suggested that problems will arise from the
use of the qualifications of the attorney as a test of adequate representa-
tion, since judges will be hesitant to state their belief that an attorney
is not qualified to conduct the litigation.' The trial court, rather than
scored by the obvious fact that his interest, as sole plaintiff, is miniscule
compared to the interests of the class as a whole. The number of plaintiffs
bringing a class action in relation to the numerical size of the class, of
course, should not be the sole basis for determining the existence or non-
existence of a class action; however, it can be a valid and important factor
in assessing plaintiff's ability to adequately represent an entire class ...
[I]t is impossible to assume that he alone with a comparatively miniscule
and limited interest in odd-lot transactions can represent that large a class,
many of whose members necessarily have larger and different interests.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court
of appeals, in condemning the use of quantitative factors, also failed to distinguish
the two concepts involved, at one point disapproving of "[1]anguage to the effect
that a small number of claimants cannot adequately represent an entire class . .."
and immediately thereafter noting that "one of the primary functions of the class
suit is to provide 'a device for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are
too small to justify legal action but which are of significant size if taken as a
group.'" 391 F.2d at 563. In the first instance, the court is talking about the
number of representatives, and in the latter, apparently the amount of the repre-
sentatives' interest is the factor considered.
31391 F.2d at 562-63.
Id. at 562.
" See Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action
1969]
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looking at the attorney's ability, should look instead at his economic
qualifications-"the ability of the attorney to spend a sufficient amount
of time and money to discover all the necessary facts, to line up expert
witnesses and to handle the other demands imposed by the proper conduct
of complex litigation." 4 The court in Eisen was perhaps alluding to
such factors by its assertion that the attorney should be "generally able
to conduct the proposed litigation."3 "
An added source of protection for the rights of absentees, as the
court noted, is found in Rule 23 itself, which gives the trial court ex-
tensive and flexible control over the class action.30 Thus, judicial
Ride: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
889 (1968).
Id. at 904.
'5 391 F.2d at 562. But see Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D.
559 (D. Minn. 1968), a decision that follows Eisen. There the court apparently
considered the attorney's abilities rather than his economic qualifications:
It is to be noted though that chief counsel for the Third Division plaintiffs is
an experienced antitrust lawyer, having only recently left the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice. He represents the second largest city in
Minnesota, a large school district, two significant housing authorities, and
now the Metropolitan Airport Commission. It is apparent that his repre-
sentation will be fair, adequate and prosecuted with vigor.
Id. at 567-68. Here is the way the court in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), handled the problem:
Until the contrary is demonstrated, courts will assume that members of the
bar are skilled in their profession. In point of fact, irrefutable evidence of
his competence and fervor is reflected in the papers and arguments thus far
submitted by the plaintiff's attorney. He has demonstrated that he is both
willing and competent to undertake the responsibilities which this litigation
entails.
Id. at 496.
36391 F.2d at 564. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), (d), (e). The court's order
allowing the action to be maintained as a class action "may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c). The court may require
for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair con-
duct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may
direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the pro-
posed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene
and present claims or defenses, or otherwise come into the action. ...
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2). The court may "impose conditions on the representa-
tive parties or on intervenors. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (3). Court approval
of any settlement or compromise is required. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
Still another way that the interests of absentees are protected in class actions
is through the requirement of initial notice of the action to absentees. New
Rule 23 requires a particular standard of notice for actions brought under sub-
section (b) (3).
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort ....
[VCol. 47
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supervision as well as representation in advocacy is provided to safe-
guard the interests of the classy However, the elimination of the use
of quantitative factors, by taking away easily applied criteria, may tend
to cause the courts to rely too heavily on these powers given them under
the rule. The consequent danger is that they may fail sufficiently to
assess the representatives' qualifications, thereby not only undercutting
the function of the class representatives, but also imperiling the court's
own role as impartial arbiter of the litigation.
This tendency already is apparent in recent cases brought under new
Rule 23 (both before and after Eisen), where despite a wide divergence
of views as to what standards the representative must meet, emphasis is
uniformly placed on the power of the court to protect absentees. In
Dolgow v. Anderson,3" it was held that plaintiff must share the interests
of the class and must be willing to "put up a real fight"39 to qualify as
representative, while the court noted it had "a broad range of discretion
to assure adequacy of representation according to the individual circum-
stances of every case."' 40 In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,41 adequacy of
representation was seen to depend on the size of the class and the nature
of the action, and the uniqueness of the relationship between the repre-
sentative and the class. Reliance on overly stringent standards was not
deemed necessary, "for it underestimates the ability of a court to safe-
guard the interests of all parties."'42 In an action brought by the former
owner of two of some 4,700 shares of stock which allegedly were fraud-
ulently purchased from about 1,000 minority stockholders, the court
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2). The trial court in Eisen interpreted the standard to
mean, under the facts there, that published notice would not be acceptable. Since
other forms of notice would be financially prohibitive, the district court ruled
that the suit could not continue as a class action. The court of appeals, however,
suggested that published notice might be acceptable, "particularly where require-
ment of a different form of notice would, in effect, prevent potentially meritorious
claims from being litigated." Id. at 570. A thorough analysis of the notice prob-
lem in Eisen is beyond the scope of this note; it is discussed in Comment, note
33 supra. See also Comment, Spurious Class Actions Based Upon Securities
Frauds Under the Revised Federal Rides of Civil Procedure, 35 FORD. L. :R.v.
295, 309-11 (1966), where it is suggested that adoption of the trial court's view in
Eisen of the notice requirement would make large class actions impossible; and
see Note, Proposed Ride 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629 (1965).
3TSee generally, Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 199-295 (1950).
843 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Id. at 494.
'OId. at 496.
" 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
°Id. at 727.
"Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co. of America, 43 F.R.D. 169 (D.S.D. 1967).
19691
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questioned plaintiff's ability to represent the class on the basis of either
of two factors, "be it the number of plaintiffs in relation to the number
of claimants or the interest of the plaintiff in relation to the interest of the
group... ."4 The court allowed plaintiff to represent the class, however,
because "if, at a later date, sufficient doubt is raised as to the adequacy of
representation, this court is empowered to act accordingly. 4' In Kronen-
berg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, I1c.,4 1 the court allowed plaintiffs to
represent the class: "At this juncture, it cannot be said that the named
plaintiffs do not adequately represent the class. In any event, the power
remains with the court to insure the adequate representation of the
class.""
The reliance on the court's power to protect absentees is apparent in
these cases, as is the lack of clearly defined standards to determine the
plaintiff's ability to adequately represent the class. With the discarding of
the use of quantitative factors, it will now be necessary for the court to
analyze closely at the outset of the action the scope and the interests of
the class, and the interests and abilities of the representatives, so that
the two may be compared and a reasonable assessment made of the rep-
resentatives' ability to protect the absentee class members. Such a de-
termination by the court of the representatives' qualifications should be
considered essential in all class actions. In this way greater reliance can
be placed on the representatives to protect the class during the course
of the litigation; the court will be left with a lesser role in this area,
thereby minimizing any jeopardization of its traditional impartiality.
Eisen presents an especially difficult situation for use of the class ac-
tion device in view of the obvious problems in managing and adminis-
tering so large a class.4 Nevertheless, the decision should open the way
for greater utilization of Rule 23 where there are numerous class mem-
bers, all with small claims. And if a comprehensive evaluation of the
class representatives' qualifications to represent the class is made by the
court, there should be no lessening in the protection afforded absentees.
JOHN M. MURcHIsoN, JR.
"Id. at 174.
I0d.4041 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
,
7 Id. at 46.
"' The problems of administrating such an action as the Eisen case led dissent-
ing Chief judge Lumbard to describe it as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a
class action." 391 F.2d at 572.
[Vol. 47
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Civil Procedure-Discovery of Expert Information
A party's effective preparation for trial may depend on his ability
to discover facts and opinions from his adversary's experts. Although
modern discovery in many respects is broad, discovery of experts' infor-
mation often tends to be quite narrow. A recent case, Security Industries,
Inc. v. Fickus,1 rejected various arguments for protecting against such
pre-trial disclosure. An analysis of the decision points up recent trends
and approaches taken to the problem.
Plaintiff was injured and two family members were asphyxiated while
using a camper unit that contained gas utilities manufactured by four
separate companies. Upon suit for the resulting deaths and injuries, one
firm moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 for produc-
tion of all parties' written reports concerning "any examination, testing,
operation, or observation"' of any part of the camper unit, including the
gas utility oven. The gas oven's manufacturer filed opposition, and the
superior court denied the discovery motion. In reversing this ruling, the
Alaska Supreme Court considered the three grounds most frequently
advanced in advocating protection from discovery of expert information:
the work-product doctrine, the attorney-client privilege, and the asserted
unfairness of disclosure. The court rejected the applicability of the work-
product rule, stating that discovery of an expert's opinions and con-
clusions does not violate the lawyer-privacy rationale of the Hickman v.
Taylor rule.8 In holding ,that no attorney-client privilege was being vi-
olated by the discovery, the court declared that "communication of rele-
vant facts by an expert to an attorney should not place such facts beyond
the ambit of discovery procedures."4 Assertions of unfairness were dis-
missed as subordinate to -the attainment of discovery objectives such as
"elimination of surprise at trial, location and preservation of evidence,
and the encouragement of settlement or expeditious trial of litigation."5
The discovery rules invest in trial judges sufficient discretion and power,
the court submitted, to minimize any actual unfairness.
6
Other courts, both state and federal, have frequently been confronted
'439 P.2d 172 (Alas. 1968).
'439 P.2d at 173 (Alas. 1968).8329 U.S. 495 (1947).
'439 P.2d at 177-78.
' Id. at 178. The court quoted from a previous decision, Miller v. Harpster,
392 P.2d 21 (Alas. 1964), in the disposition of this point.0 439 P.2d at 178.
1969]
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with the work-product rule, the attorney-client privilege, and considera-
tions of unfairness as grounds for extending protection from discovery of
expert information; widely disparate conclusions have been reached.
In considering the work-product contention, some courts have held
expert information to be within the protection of the rule.7 Of over thirty
states that have substantially adopted the federal discovery system,' fif-
teen9 have adopted either by rule or decision the "Hickman Amend-
ment."1 These provisions extend work-product protection to written
trial preparations of attorneys, agents, and experts unless discovery is
justified by a showing of unfair prejudice, undue hardship, or injustice.
Four states" omit any provision for a showing that allows disclosure
'United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960); United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959); White Pine
Copper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 166 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mich. 1958); Empire
Box Corp. v. Illinois Cereal Mills, 47 Del. 283, 90 A.2d 672 (Super. Ct. 1952);
Ford Motor Co. v. Havee, 123 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See Berkley
v. Clark Equip. Co., 26 F.R.D. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954).
8 ALAS. R. Civ. P. 26-37; ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26-37; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-348
to -361 (1962); CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 2019-34 (West 1955); COLO. R. Civ. P.
26-37; DEL. CH. R. 26-37 and DEL. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 26-37; FLA. R. Civ. P.
§§ 1.280-.400 (1967) ; GA. CODE ANN. tit. 81A, §§ 126-37 (Supp. 1967) ; HAWAII R.
Civ. P. 26-37; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 26-37; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, §§ 201-19
(1967); IOWA R. Civ. P. 121-34, 140-44 (Supp. 1968); Ky. R. CIv. P. 26-37; LA.
CODE CiV. PROC. ANN. tit. 3, art. 1421-1515 (1960); ME. R. Civ. P. 26-37; MD.
R.P. 400-22; MINN. R. Civ. P. 26-37; Mo. R. Civ. P. 56-61; MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. ch. 2701, Rules 26-37 (1960); NF. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1267.01 - .44 (1956);
NEV. R. Civ. P. 26-37; N.J. SUPER. CT. Civ. PRAc. R. 4:16-:27; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21-1-1(26)- (37) (1953); N.D.R. Civ. P. 26-37; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 41.615,
41.625, 45.181-.250 (1953); PA. R. Civ. P. 4001-20; S.D. CODE §§ 36.0501-.0532,
36.0601-.0607 (1939); TEX R. Civ. P. 167-70, 186a, 186b, 187-88; UTAH R. Civ.
P. 26-37; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1231-67 (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1968);
WASH. R. PLEADING, PRAc. & PROC. 26-37; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26-37; Wyo. R. CIv.
P. 26-37. North Carolina's version, N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-i, Rules 26-37, becomes
effective July 1, 1969.
9 Ky. R. Civ. P. 30.02, 37.02; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 26(b) ; IOwA R. Civ. P. 141(a);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. tit. 3, art. 1452 (1960); ME. R. Civ. P. 26(b);
MINN. R. Cxv. P. 26.02; Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01(b); NEV. R. CIv. P. 30(b); N.J.
SUPER. CT. Civ. PiAc. R. 4:16-2; PA. R. Civ. P. 4011(d); TEx. R. Civ. P. 167,
186a; UTAH R. Civ. P. 30(b); WASH. R. PLEADING, PRAC. & PROC. 26(b); W.
VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 34(b). MD. R.P. 410d is another such provision, but Rule
410c expressly subjects experts' reports to discovery. Illinois has superseded its
"Hickman Amendment," ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.19-5 (1956), with a pro-
vision for more liberal discovery: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201 (b)2 (1967).
lo ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES 'FOR CIVIL PROC., REPORT OF PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROC. FOR THE DIsTRIcT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
39-40 (1946). The United States Supreme Court, in deciding Hickman, implicitly
rejected the proposed amendment, showing a preference for resolution by decision
rather than by rule.
" MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02; Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01 (b); PA. R. Civ. P. 4011 (d);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 167, 186a.
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and thereby absolutely preclude discovery of an expert's written trial
preparation materials.' 2 Several of the courts which extend work-prod-
uct protection to expert information distinguish, however, between ex-
pert "opinion" and "fact," barring discovery of the former while per-
mitting disclosure of the latter.'3 Other courts, entertaining the ultimate
ascertainment of the truth and the correct adjudication as their primary
concerns, have refused to apply work-product protection to expert in-
formation.14
Since hired experts' reports are usually made to aid attorneys in pre-
paring for trial, these reports are ordinarily protected from discovery by
the attorney-client privilege, unless a showing of special justification is
made.' 5 A distinction between communications and knowledge has often
been noted;16 with some exceptions' 7 discovery of knowledge held by
expert witnesses has been allowed.' Perhaps a fair statement is that the
majority deny blanket application of the attorney-client privilege where
such an application could operate to suppress admissible evidence.
Recently a third contention based on assertions of unfairness has
gained headway. Two theories underlie this contention. Arguably the
information is the expert's property, and hence belongs to the party who
"buys" it from him." Also, it is asserted that a system of unlimited
1 For an extreme result reached through applying this rule, see Ex parte
Ladon, 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959), where a driver-compiled list of
names and addresses of witnesses to a bus accident was protected as work-product.
1 Berkley v. Clark Equip. Co., 26 F.R.D. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); United States
v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959); White Pine Copper
Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 166 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mich. 1958); Walsh v. Reyn-
olds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954).
1 Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948); United
States v. Nysco Labs., Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Leding v. United
States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959); cf. Greyhound Corp. v. Su-
perior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
" Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950); Empire
Box Corp. v. Illinois Cereal Mills, 47 Del. 283, 90 A.2d 672 (Super. Ct. 1952);
City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40
(1957).
"E.g., Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 24 F.R.D. 493 (M.D.N.C. 1960);
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. Pa.), modified,
32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
1 American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Pet. Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680 (D.R.I.
1959); Cold Metal Proc. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D.
Mass. 1947); City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 Ill. 2d 431, 143
N.E.2d 40 (1957).
1, E.g., United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967); Cold Metal
Proc. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947); United
States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). For a complete
analysis, see Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Infor-
mation, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455 (1962).1 See Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954).
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discovery would promote laziness and encourage parties, by waiting for
the other to hire the necessary experts, to jockey for position. 20 As re-
gards the "property right" concept, where a party subpoenas an expert
as an ordinary witness, the majority of courts hold that the expert must
give knowledge already acquired, 21 but not information that requires
additional research.22 A number of courts apparently are greatly influ-
enced by arguments that expertise is property, and compensation must
be made for its taking; these courts permit the expert to refuse to testify
as to his opinions and conclusions23 unless compensated for such testi-
mony."4 The fear that laziness and tactical sparring would result from
open discovery of experts' reports seems justified where the discovering
party seeks to use the expert's disclosures to support his case at trial. But
where discovery is sought to prepare for cross-examination of the expert
at trial, this fear is not well-founded; several cases have allowed the
motion for discovery on this basis.25
Confusion and disagreement obviously pervade existing case law; the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules recently proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules to clarify the situation and resolve discovery problems.20
One amendment would require a showing of "good cause" for obtaining
discovery of all trial preparation materials, except that statements con-
2 See Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950).21E.g., Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); City and County of San Fran-
cisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951) ; In re Estate of James,
10 Ill. App. 2d 232, 134 N.E.2d 638 (1956); In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E.
791 (1931).
Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389 (1875) (dictum); Brown County v. Hall,
61 S.D. 568, 249 N.W. 253 (1933) (dictum); Ealy v. Shetler Ice Cream Co.,
108 W. Va. 184, 150 S.E. 539 (1929).
" Hoagland v. TVA, 34 F.R.D. 458 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Walsh v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877);
People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947);
Cooper v. Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth., 197 Va. 653, 90 S.E.2d 788 (1956)(dictum).
" City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231
P.2d 26 (1951); Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877). Other cases, e.g., Boynton
v. R.J. Reynolds Tob. Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941), allow an expert to
refuse to testify concerning his opinions and conclusions even when offered com-
pensation therefor.
" United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); Franks v. National
Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v.
United States, 39 F.R.D. 1 (D. Colo. 1966); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land,
32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963); United States v. 62.50 Acres of Land, 23 F.R.D.
287 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
2 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF TIE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF
CIVIL PROC. FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS RELATING TO DEPOSITION
AND DISCOVERY, 43 F.R.D. 211 (1967).
[Vol. 47
DISCOVERY OF EXPERT INFORMATION
cerning the action previously given by the party seeking discovery would
require no showing to be discovered." The Advisory Committee omits
the "good cause" showing from Federal Rule 34, effectively trans-
posing the requirement, as developed by case law, from the production of
documents generally to the area of trial preparation materials alone. This
proposal would protect from discovery materials prepared for litigation
by attorneys, consultants, sureties, insurers, indemnitors, and agents, un-
less the required showing of good cause could be made. While the Ad-
visory Committee purports to give greater protection to some trial prep-
aration materials (especially those of attorneys) than to others,2 the
probable effect of implementing the new proposal might well be a con-
striction of the scope of discovery of trial preparation materials in those
more "liberal" jurisdictions.
The Advisory Committee further proposes changes specifically re-
lating to discovery of experts' trial preparations ;2 they distinguish be-
tween experts who have been retained or specially employed and those
whom a party expects to call as trial witnesses. As to the former, a
showing that denial of discovery would result in undue hardship or mani-
fest injustice is required. The Advisory Committee asserts that dis-
covery of material acquired outside trial preparation (i.e., knowledge
previously acquired) is not thereby precluded, but only discovery from
experts informally consulted is barred. 0 As to experts expected to
testify at trial, due notice of their identity and field of expertise is re-
quired. Discovery of both fact and opinion relevant to the stated sub-
ject matter is permitted, and such discovery as would be allowed could
be conditioned upon payment of a portion of the expert's fees and
expenses.
The Advisory Committee submits that any unfairness would thereby
be minimized, as discovery would usually be limited to witnesses, and
"obtained at a time when the parties know who their expert witnesses
will be. A party must as a practical matter prepare his own case in ad-
vance of that time, for he can hardly hope to build his own case out of his
", Id. at 225, Proposed Rule 26(b) (3).
.
8Id. at 232 (Advisory Comm.'s Notes).
" Id. at 225-26, Proposed Rule 26(b) (4).
" Id. at 234. The Advisory Committee, id. at 233, purports to "reject as ill-
considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information within the
work-product doctrine," yet the required showing for discovery of specially re-
tained experts, said to be based on the doctrine of "unfairness," is substantially
the same as that required under work-product.
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opponent's experts. Discovery is limited to opinions previously given
by the expert or to be given by him on direct examination at trial.""' The
courts, of course, have power to regulate any abuses.
The proposed amendment in relation to expert trial witnesses appears
to be a useful addition to federal discovery procedures; where expert tes-
timony is crucial it will be allowed; and the proposal adequately provides
for fairness to the respective parties. The amendment in relation to re-
tained experts not expected to appear as witnesses, however, seems to
threaten an increased protection from disclosure. Any foreclosure of
discovery of expert information by rule is unwarranted. Numerous cases
have been resolved on the basis of experts' findings; pre-trial discovery
of such findings will be vital in future cases, and could be curtailed by
the proposed rule's comparative inflexibility. The proposed amendment
has been criticized in a recent decision,32 which postulated that the show-
ing required for discovery of retained experts is too harsh. Since a
party does not know what such experts have learned or what opinions
they have formed, how can he show that denial of discovery will result
in "undue hardship" or "manifest injustice?" The first party to reach
and "buy" an expert, because of the stringent showing required for dis-
covery of non-testifying experts, would be able to suppress unfavorable
findings of that expert simply by declining to offer his testimony at trial.
This possibility should compel further consideration of the proposed
amendment. Premature adoption of the provision might lead courts out
of the confusion of the present case law, but the discovery system could
be damaged in the extrication.
Confrontation with the morass of case law on discovery of expert
information should dispel a court's temptation to resolve a case solely on
the basis of precedent. Surely decisions can best be reached through con-
sideration of each case's individual circumstances in the light of under-
lying discovery policy. The Fickus court found that, where expert in-
formation was needed for correct ajudication, "[g]ood cause has been
demonstrated in the need to eliminate surprise at trial, and the related
need for full and effective cross-examination of opponents' expert wit-
nesses." 33 The finding is to be commended.
DAVID G. CROCKETT
3 Id. at 235.
3 2United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968).
Security Indus., Inc. v. Fickus, 439 P.2d 172, 180 (Alas. 1968).
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Conflict of Laws-Choice-of-Laws: The Greatest Interest Rule
The vacillating and often conflicting theories regarding choice-of-law1
that have developed since Babcock v. Jackson2 were reconsidered in the
recent New York case of Miller v. Miller.3 In Miller, by a four to three
decision, the New York Court of Appeals expanded its earlier Babcock
ruling and adopted a "greatest interest rule" for its choice-of-law con-
flicts rule. By its new rule the court sought to avoid the anomalies that
can occur by adherence to one particular theory or by an ad hoc deter-
mination of particular cases.
Mr. Earl Miller, a New York resident, was on a business trip in
Maine, where he and his brother had mutual business interests. While
a passenger in a car driven by his brother and owned by his sister-in-law,
Mr. Miller was killed when the vehicle struck a bridge located in Maine.
The automobile trip began and was to end in Maine. Later, decedent's
brother and sister-in-law, who were Maine residents at the time of the
accident, moved to New York state. Thereafter, the decedent's wife
commenced in New York a wrongful death action against his brother and
sister-in-law. As a partial defense, the defendants asserted the Maine
statute that limits wrongful death recoveries to 20,000 dollars, which had
been in effect in Maine at the time of the accident, but which had since
'When a true conflict exists, commentators have offered different approaches:(a) The forum's law should always be applied to effectuate forum policy, even
though the policy of another jurisdiction would thereby be defeated. ]3. CURUE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 181-87 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SELECTED ESSAYS]; Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Develop-
went in Conflicts of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212, 1242-43 (1963) (this collec-
tion of comments by several authors on Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), will be hereinafter cited as Comments
ont Babcock v. Jackson, with a parenthetical indication of the appropriate author).
(b) The forum should weigh the interests and apply the dominant one. Reese,
Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 688
(1963). (c) The law of the state with the most significant relationship should
control. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1964). (d) Apply the forum's law except when variations are necessary to
accommodate the interests of the parties. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 101-20 (1962); Comments on Babcock v. Jackson (Ehrenzweig) 1246. (e)
Courts should work out rules of preference, applying the "lower standard of con-
duct or of a financial protection" in the absence of a pre-existing relationship
between the parties. D. CAERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCEss 114 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as TEE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS]; Cavers, The Two "Local-Law"
Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822 (1950); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Con-
flicts Problems, 21 U. PITT. L. REv. 573, 580 (1960).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
222 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
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been repealed. 4 On a motion to dismiss the partial defense, the trial court
allowed the motion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, choosing
New York law, which allowed full and unlimited recovery for a wrong-
ful death action.
In reaching its decision, the court traced the development of its pres-
ent choice-of-law rule. At the outset it conceded that "candor requires
the admission that our past decisions have lacked a precise consis-
tency .... -" The first case considered by the Miller court in its chro-
nological chart was Babcock, a 1963 decision.' In Babcock, the court
refused to apply an Ontario guest statute barring recovery because all
the parties involved were New York residents; the car was garaged, li-
censed, and insured in New York; the trip began and was to end in New
York; and Ontario was merely the place of the accident. The rule of
Babcock was that "[j]ustice, fairness, and 'the best practical result' ...
may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the juris-
diction, which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence
or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation."' The Babcock rule, denominated under such various head-
ings as "grouping of contacts" and "center of gravity,",, had its origin
in earlier New York tort cases.9 In a 1954 contracts case the emphasis
was put upon the law of the place "which has the most significant con-
tacts with the matter in dispute."" Babcock unequivocally rejected the
traditional choice-of-law rule, lex loci delicti, which looked invariably to
the substantive law of the place of the tort. The traditional rule "ignores
the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred
may have in the resolution of particular issues."" It could be contended
that Babcock discarded the rigid and mechanical lex loci rule and re-
placed it with another mechanical rule, i.e., a mere quantitative grouping
'No Maine decisions deal with the retroactivity of the amendment, but the
prevailing rule is that such amendments are substantive in nature, and, without
clear contrary legislation or legislative intent, are not applied retroactively. See
generally Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1964).
522 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
'Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
7Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.8Id.
° See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), re-
viewed in Currie, Conflict, Crises and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1,
noted in Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rnv. 371 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), noted in Note, Selection
of Law Governing Measure of Damages for Wrongful Death, 61 CoLum. L. REv.
1497 (1961).
'
0 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954).12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1963).
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of contacts whereby the court adds the contacts of -the two states and the
state with the greatest number of contacts has its law applied. However,
in it re Estate of CrichtonP2 and In re Estate of Clark, 3 the court re-
jected such an approach and stated that "[c]ontacts obtain significance
only to the extent that they relate to the policies and purposes sought to
be vindicated by the conflicting laws."' 4 Thus, the Miller case gave the
court an opportunity to explain further and demonstrate its rule as it has
evolved. The court set forth its new choice-of-law rule as follows:
[T]he rule which has evolved clearly in our most recent decisions is
that the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the liti-
gation will be applied and the facts or contacts which obtain signif-
icance in defining State interests are those which relate to the pur-
pose of the particular law in conflict.15
This doctrine might be denominated the "greatest interest rule."
After defining its new rule, the court demonstrated its application.
New York, by its Constitution, not only permits full recovery for wrong-
ful death, but also prohibits any legislative act providing otherwise. 6
Thus, New York is vitally concerned with compensating the economic
losses of a decedent's family, probably to protect its citizens from becom-
ing wards of the state. Although this substantial New York interest per
se might have allowed the courts to apply its law, 17 the new rule required
a look into more general considerations, which should concern "a justice-
dispensing court in a modern American State.""'
These countervailing considerations include fairness to the nominal
and real party defendant, expectations of the parties, possible interference
1220 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).
1821 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
1,20 N.Y.2d at 135 n.8, 228 N.E.2d at 806 n.8, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820 n.8; 21
N.Y.2d at 485-86, 236 N.E.2d at 156, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
15 22 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 736. See Reich v. Pur-
cell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967) ; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416
Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408
(1965); Comnents on Babcock v. Jackson (Currie) 1235; Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657 (1959).
"o N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18.
17 SELECTED EssAYs 181-87; Comments on Babcock v. Jackson (Currie) 1242-
43. In the case of an unavoidable conflict between the legitimate interests of two
sister states, Professor Currie would have the court apply the law of the forum.
Many writers have commented on the Currie approach. See Hill, Governmental
Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L.
REv. 463 (1960); Traynor, Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 845 (1961); Whitman, Conflict of Spousal Immunity Laws:
The Legislature Takes A Hand, 46 N.C.L. REv. 506 (1968).
' Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 267, 295 (1966).
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with a legitimate interest of a sister state, and the prevention of forum
shopping. First, it would be unfair for the forum to apply its law to a
party patterning his conduct upon another state's statute; however, in
Miller the Maine statute limiting a wrongful death recovery is remedial
in nature, obviously, and not a statute upon which a person would rely
in governing his conduct. Second, the liability insurer, the real party in
interest, might be harmed by the application of New York law. The court
found through an analysis of the actuarial process and information gath-
ered from the Insurance Commission of Maine that the presence of the
20,000 dollars limitation had no substantial effect on insurance rates, and
that refusing to apply Maine law would have little, if any, effect on the
insurance premiums in Maine. Third, as to the expectations of the
parties, the court considered it an obvious fiction that parties rely on
certain statutes and expect their application in a lawsuit.2"
Though our nation is divided into fifty-one separate legal systems,
our people act most of the time as if they live in a single one. They
suffer from a chronic failure to take account of the differences in state
laws.
21
There are few speculations more difficult than assessment of the expec-
tations of parties as to the laws applicable to their activities, and this is
especially true when the expectations relate to the law of torts.22 Fourth,
Maine by its statutory limitation, showed a desire to protect its residents
in wrongful death actions. The fact that the defendants in Miller were
no longer Maine residents meant to the court that to apply New York
law would not unduly interfere with a legitimate interest of Maine in
regulating the rights of its citizens, since no judgment would be entered
against a Maine resident. Finally, a court might ignore a change in
domicile to prevent forum shopping, but apparently the court found that
the defendants' move to New York was not made to achieve a more fa-
vorable legal climate. The Miller court compiled these various contacts re-
lating them to the countervailing interests and expectations of the parties
and of the two states. This approach is vastly different from a mere
numerical or quantitative grouping of contacts and from the mechanical
application of the law of the place of the tort.
1- 22 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 740. See Morris, En-
terprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YALE L.J. 554, 560-81 (1961).
20 22 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 883, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
"Tra CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 119.
22 Id. at 302. See also Traynor, Conflict of Laws in Time, 1967 DuxE L.J. 713,
715.
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Due to the myriad of writers and rules in the choice-of-law area, the
"greatest interest rule," as defined in Miller, may still be misunderstood.
Such potential misunderstanding is aptly demonstrated in the dissenting
opinions in Miller. Two dissenters would have applied Maine law under
either the "significant contacts rule" of Babcock, the principle of prefer-
ence, or the newly emerging "greatest interest rule." The significant
contacts in Miller would be that Maine was the place of the accident; the
car was licensed and garaged in Maine; the trip was wholly in Maine;
the trip was connected with Maine business; and, decedent's stay in Maine
was not transient but was one of several recurring sojourns in connec-
tion with a business in Maine. Thus, Maine law would be applied under
the Babcock doctrine since Maine had the most significant contacts.23
As to Professor Caver's approach to a principle of preference,24 both
Maine and New York have an interest in applying their rules regarding
damages, and therefore a true conflict exists. Under this analysis, the
"lower standard of conduct or of a financial protection" of the state where
defendant acted and the injury occurred should be applied in the absence
of a previously existing relationship between the parties.25 Lastly, these
dissenters felt the majority had applied the interest analysis too rigidly
and had given too much weight to the domicile of the parties seeking re-
covery. The dominant consideration in adjudication of multistate trans-
actions is the "reasonable expectations of persons participating in transac-
tions," 20 since this lends justice to the determination. The majority, as
previously mentioned, rejected the reasonable expectation argument as
being based upon an obvious fiction that it is possible in tort cases to
assess the parties' expectations of what law governs their actions.
In their consideration of the greatest interest rule, the dissenters
thought the majority had adopted Professor Currie's approach of gov-
ernmental interest analysis, which leads to the conclusion that a party
carries most of the defenses and rights of his domiciliary law about with
him." States then must apply their law to protect legitimate objects of
"
3 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 749 (1963).
" THE C OiCE-OF-LAw PROCESS 114-138; Cavers, The Two "Local Law"
Theories, 63 HARV. L. REv. 822 (1950); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
" See THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 114; note 1(e) sapra.
2022 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 886, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 747. See Rheinstein,
Book Review, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 369 (1965).
122 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 885, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 746. For Professor
Currie's analysis of the governmental interest approach, see SELECTED ESSAYS
183-84.
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their legislative concern.28 Professor Currie would have the court in-
quire into the policies of the respective conflicting laws and then "inquire
into the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states
to assert an interest in the application of those policies." 29 Yet, after the
above construction and interpretation, if there is still a "conflict between
the legitimate interests of the two states, . . . [Currie would] apply the
law of the forum."" Certainly, the majority adopted aspects of several
approaches, and in applying the rule illustrated the duty of a court to
compare all countervailing considerations. The New York "greatest in-
terest rule" then is more flexible than Professor Currie's approach, while
containing similar features. The rule adequately analyzes the forum's
relationship to .the case in terms of possible forum interests and adds a
flavor of individualized justice in its countervailing considerations.
North Carolina has not entered the battleground of the conflicting
choice-of-law rules, choosing instead to retain the traditional lex loci
delicti rule.31 The reason for not abandoning lex loci is probably based
upon a desire for stability and predictibility through stare decisis, and a
desire that the legislature make any change in the present conflicts rule.
In 1967, the North Carolina General Assembly did modify the state's
traditional rule as it applies to spousal immunity. 2 It is evident that the
North Carolina courts will not venture into what it has termed a "voy-
28See SELECTED ESSAYS 183-84; Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205, 221-22 (1958).2 Comments on Babcock v. Jackson (Currie) 1242.
2oId. at 1242-43.
"1 The reports are filled with cases that praise and follow lex loci. See, e.g.,
Hutchins v. Day, 269 N.C. 607, 153 S.E.2d 132 (1967); Petrea v. Ryder, 264
N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Doss v. Seawell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899
(1962); Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260, 34 S.E.2d 185 (1945). See Wurfel,
Conflict of Laws, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 923 (1966).
This traditional, mechanical choice of law rule of lex loci delicti, embodied in the
first RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 383 (1934), is that the substantive
rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by the
law of the place of the tort. It has as its conceptual foundation the vested rights
doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the
jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its existence and extent
solely on such law. Professor Beale explained that "[i]t is impossible for a
plaintiff to recover in tort unless he has been given by some law a cause of action
in tort; and this cause of action can be given only by the law of the place where
the tort was committed. That is the place where the injurious event occurs, and
its law is the law therefore which applies to it." 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT oF LAWS §
378.1 (1935).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5.1 (Supp. 1967). This statute and its implications
upon existing choice-of-law doctrines has been discussed by Professor Whitman.
He considers the Currie governmental interest analysis in depth and concludes
that the legislature should further consider the choice-of-law problem on a case-by-
case, fact-by-fact basis. See Whitman, supra note 17, at 519.
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age into ... an uncharted sea,"33 preferring the comfortable predictibility
of stare decisis to individualized justice. In this still inchoate area of
law, however, a case-by-case development of rules without rigid adherence
to any one theory is necessary in order to establish sound principles.
"The objective is to achieve justice in a particular case and cases of like
kind, avoiding ideology, on the one hand, and particularistic result-ori-
ented determinations, on the other." 4 This rational approach would
end ad hoc decisions. If a court, choosing between particular state laws,
can identify the policies embodied in those laws and determine if a true
conflict exists,35 then it should use the facts or contacts to determine
which state has a better claim, giving weight to the parties' expectations
and other countervailing considerations. A few wide-sweeping rules
could thus be avoided. This process would give hope that decisions
founded upon discriminating assessments of policies and expectations
will slowly build up a body of differentiated rules to which courts can
adhere, bringing predictibility back into play. North Carolina for the
present is content with lex loci. Perhaps a rule so well defined as the
'(greatest interest rule' will cause the court to reassess its status quo
position and perceive the possible individualized justice for each case and
a possible predictibility therein.
ERIC Miuzs HOLMES
Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-One Man, One Vote
Applied to Local Governing Bodies
The one man, one vote rule of the United States Supreme Court has.
been described as "the symbol of an aspiration for fairness, for avoidance
of complexity and for intelligibility in our representational processes in
our mass democracy." 1 By Avery v. Midland County,2 the Court has
expanded the equal representation concept of Reynolds v. Sims3 and its
" Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 616, 129 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1963).
122 N.Y.2d at -, 237 N.E.2d at 890, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 752. See also THE:
CHOIcE-OF-LAw PROCESS 121-23.
"See geterally, Traynor, supra note 15; Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF.
L. REv. 74 (1967).
'Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What Is Fair Representation?, 5I
A.B.A.J. 319, 324 (1965).390 U.S. 474 (1968).
'377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court said:
[W]e conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity
for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.
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companion cases4 from the statehouses of the nation to thousands of
county courthouses, city councils, school districts, and similar local gov-
.erning bodies. Phrased simply, the decision means that many, if not
most, representative bodies elected on the local level must be chosen
.under a scheme whereby the men who sit on them represent substantially
equal numbers of people.5 Avery itself did not commence the trend of
applying the one man, one vote rule to local government; but it did settle
the issue in favor of a line of state and lower federal court cases so ex-
-tending the Reynolds principle." The decision is significant 7 because the
,Court for a time declined any opportunity to apply the rule to local gov-
ernments and governing boards after the Reynolds decision.
8
The holding in Avery brings to a predictable conclusion the trend
begun when the Court decided in Baker v. Carr' that apportionment and
Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment ...
Id. at 566.
'Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Ass., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm.
for Fair Rep. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
US. 633 (1964).
5390 U.S. at 478-79.
' The majority opinion in Avery mentioned several cases from state supreme
courts and federal district courts extending Reynolds to local governments. 390
U.S. at 479 n.3. But see Bianchi v. Griffing, 271 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 901 (1967); Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala.
1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Johnson v. Genesee County,
232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964); Simon v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury,
226 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. La. 1964). As the only state supreme court holdings
contrary to its decision in Avery, the Court cited Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377
Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966), where the Michigan court divided four to four
on the issue; and the Texas Supreme Court decision in Avery v. Midland County,
406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966), which was vacated and remanded to the Texas
court.
" In the month after the announcement of Avery, for instance, both the Col-
orado and Iowa supreme courts cited and followed it in deciding cases challenging
the constitutionality of local governing boards. Hartman v. City & County of
Denver,-- Colo. -, 440 P.2d 778 (1968) (city council); Mandicino v. Kelly,
- Iowa - , 158 N.W.2d 754 (1968) (county board of supervisors). Avery
should also be a strong argument for the plaintiffs in a North Carolina reap-
portionment case, Jacobs v. Gaston County, filed in Gaston County Superior Court,
challenging the constitutionality of the Gaston County Board of Commissioners.
A news report of the suit is contained in The Charlotte Observer, Sept. 24, 1968,
§ 2, at 1, col. 1.
8 Bianchi v. Griffing, 389 U.S. 901, denying cert. to 271 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y.
1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S.
105 (1967); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), vacating and remanding
256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966). As will be discussed at length, the Court
had valid, practical reasons for not extending the application of one man, one vote
to local governments in both Sailors and Dusch.
p369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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districting is a justiciable issue in federal courts and not merely a political
question. But the Court in Avery also crossed the line that remained
after its decision in Reynolds. Was the crossing of that line a mistake
that constitutes a rigid, unwise approach with respect to the multitude of
local governmental units of varying sizes and purposes, having general
governmental powers? Or does application of the mathematically simple
one man, one vote rule to local entities still retain sufficient flexibility to
enable courts to reach desirable solutions in reapportionment cases in-
volving local governments?
Midland County, Texas, was governed by a five-member board called
the Midland County Commissioners Court, which performed various
legislative, executive, and judicial functions. One member, the county
judge, was elected at large by the voters of the county; however, he could
vote only in case of a tie. The other four commissioners were chosen
from four districts with an estimated population of 67,906 for the city
of Midland, and 852, 828, and 414 for the three rural districts.'0 Thus,
the urban area containing 95 per cent of the population could at most
elect two representatives (one of them the county judge) to the commis-
sioners court. The commissioners were responsible for such general gov-
ernmental functions as letting contracts in the name of the county; ap-
pointing minor county administrative officials; setting the county tax
rate, including that of property owners in the city, within limits con-
trolled by the state; issuing bonds; and determining the county budget.'1
On these facts, Justice White reasoned for the majority: "[I]nsti-
tutions of local government have always been a major aspect of our
system, and their responsible and responsive operation is today of in-
creasing importance to the quality of life of more and more of our citi-
zens."' 2 Using this policy for extending the one man, one vote principle
to local governments, the Court held: "[T]he Constitution permits no
substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units
of local government having general governmental powers over the entire
geographic area served by the body."' 3
"'Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968).
"Id.
"'Id. at 481.
"Id. at 484-85. The Court thus vacated the judgment of the Texas Supreme
Court, which had ruled that the equal protection clause was violated by the ap-
portionment of districts in Midland County but that factors other than population
might be taken into account in reapportioning the county. 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
1966). The Texas Supreme Court had reversed the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
That court, in turn, had reversed the trial court. 397 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.
1965). - "J"414-1
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Justices Harlan, Fortas, and Stewart dissented. 4 Justice Harlan
restated his general disapproval of Reynolds"5 and also reasoned that
local governing bodies are so diverse in their functions that they need
to be more flexible in their structure than do state legislatures."' Justice
Stewart's rationale was the same as in his dissenting opinion in Lucas
v. Colorado General Assembly,17 where he protested that the principle
of one man, one vote as applied to even state legislatures meant a sim-
plistic, arithmetical approach.
While agreeing that the application of the equal protection clause in
reapportionment situations should not stop at the state level, Justice
Fortas also emphasized that equal protection of voters on the local level
requires more than a simplistic and blanket one man, one vote approach.'"
He appeared particularly impressed by the fact that testimony at the
trial level disclosed county roads to be the main concern of the county
commissioners. He also stressed that the state had placed a ceiling on
the tax rate set by the commissioners.
The Fortas dissent cited both Dusch v. Davis" and Sailors v. Board
of Education ° to illustrate that the Court had not in the past insisted
on a rigid application of one man, one vote to local government. Al-
though the majority in Avery specifically pointed with favor to both of
these cases,2 the cases can be distinguished from Avery on their facts.
Sailors involved what the Court characterized as an appointment of a
county-wide school board by various local school boards representing
variously populated districts; and Dusch involved an at large election
of city council members, some of whom were required to reside in dis-
tricts containing substantially unequal numbers of people.
Insofar as Justice Fortas relied on the legislative limitations on
the county commissioners' powers, his dissent may be rebutted.
If it is contended that unlimited discretion is necessary for the ex-
ercise of true legislative power, then no legislative body in the Amer-
ican system of government would qualify since each body receives its
grants of power from constitutions and/or legislation which limits
the scope of the power granted .... The current trend at the county
1 All of the dissenters thought that the writ of certiorari had been improv-
idently granted.
1r 390 U.S. at 487 (dissenting opinion).16 Id. at 490-92.
377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
'8 390 U.S. at 498-99 (dissenting opinion).
'o387 U.S. 112 (1967).
.0 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
21390 U.S. at 485.
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governing level is toward more exercise of this legislative power since
the modern urban county has been forced into exercising its legislative
authority more and more in choosing which of a broad array of pro-
grams available to it will be effectuated in a county.2
Avery applies the one man, one vote formula to certain local governing
bodies, but does not attempt to precisely define what local bodies may be
included among those having "general governmental powers." Clearly
the decision encompasses such entities as county governing boards and
city councils with at least as much legislative power as was held by the
county commissioners court in Avery. But there are myriad bodies ex-
ercising governmental power at the local level, many of them having only
one function such as sanitation or education. The Court noted in Avery
that in 1967 there were an estimated 81,304 units of government of
"staggering diversity" throughout the nation."3 One analyst of the Court's
reapportionment decisions suggests three criteria for deciding whether
the local body has "general governmental powers" over a geographic
area: (1) What functions does the entity have? If few, the courts have
justification for not applying the one man, one vote principle. (2) Is the
organization a special purpose unit, such as a port authority? If so, a
general local government is probably not involved. (3) To what extent
is the selection of members of the unit based on equal representation?
The more limited the unit's functions, the greater the variance that courts
should allow from the one man, one vote formula.24
A lawyer attempting to predict whether a certain local governing
body will come under Avery must apply the above criteria cautiously and
critically. For instance, school boards generally have one basic function
designed to fulfill a specific purpose; but where their members are elected,
several courts have specifically held that they fall under the one man,
one vote test ;25 and language in Avery itself indicates that the Supreme
Court considered school boards to be among the type of local govern-
mental entities it had in mind.2" In fact, under the rationale of Gray v.
" Oden & Meek, County Reapportionment: A Rebuttal, 18 BAYLOR L. Rzv.
15, 16-17 (1966).
'3390 U.S. at 483.
24 Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Coun-
ties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 21, 32-33
(1965). This article contains an excellent discussion of the various types of local
governmental units and the effect that extension of the one man, one vote rule
would have on them.
"
2E.g., Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Delozier
v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
'a 390 U.S. at 480.
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Sanders' 7 all locally-elected officials-including those with strictly ad-
ministrative duties-might be held to come under the one man, one vote
principle. Until more case law develops in this area, predictions concern-
ing specific categories of local governing bodies and officials may be dif-
ficult in close situations. Perhaps the only entities that will eventually
escape application of the rule are those whose members sit as the result
of a scheme more in the nature of appointment than of election.2"
Avery probably has carried not only the Reynolds rule itself into the
area of local government, but also the holdings of cases answering cer-
tain problems raised by Reynolds.2" However, Avery did leave unsettled
the population standard on which local representation is to be based,
Is it sheer population figures? Or registered voters? Or the number of
people who voted in the last election? Perhaps Hartman v. City & County
of Denver,30 a decision by the Colorado Supreme Court based primarily
on Avery, provides the answer to these questions. The court said that
reliance on the number of registered voters is not per se unconstitutional,
but in applying such figures a local government cannot "depart signif-
icantly from population-oriented standards."3 1
The most difficult issue raised by Avery is the problem of applying
the one man, one vote principle to obtain truly meaningful representa-
tion for the local electorate. To Mr. Justice Fortas, the decision in Avery
meant that the county residents would be denied meaningful representa-
tion because only in the "most superficial sense" did the commissioners
have general governmental powers, 2 their primary concern being the
construction of county roads. Even if he were correct in his analysis of
the facts, his well-reasoned dissent may be answered by the Sailors and
Dusch cases along with the majority opinion in Avery. Together the
2372 U.S. 368 (1963). The Court held that the Georgia system of voting
for senators and other statewide elected officials, including the governor and other
administrative officials, was violative of the fourteenth amendment since it resulted
in a substantial dilution of the electors' votes.
28 Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
For instance, it would appear that local governmental entities may establish
multi-member districts so long as their use is not designed to discriminate against
or cancel out some minority racial or political element. See Burns v. Richardson,
384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Mann v. Davis,
245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va.), aff'd nem. sub. nor. Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S.
42 (1965). But cf. Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa.), vacated and
remanded, 379 U.S. 40 (1964); Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556
(1964). It also appears that a local government must be reapportioned at least
once every decennial based upon the census to satisfy the Constitutional require-
ment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-84 (1964).
- Colo. - , 440 P.2d 778 (1968).
Id. at - , 440 P.2d at 783.
82 390 U.S. at 507 (dissenting opinion).
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opinions in the three cases indicate that local governments do have some
justification for experimentation and flexibility if they also recognize
the equal protection principle. For instance, if it were conceded that the
county commissioners' most important function in Midland County is
maintaining county roads, a scheme whereby all commissioners were
voted on at large but one or two of them were required to reside in a
rural geographical area might well be satisfactory.3 Such a scheme
would approach the facts approved in Dusch and would recognize the
one man, one vote principle since every citizen would have an equal vote
in determining the makeup of the county commissioners. However, some
flexibility would be preserved so that rural areas would have a voice on a
matter of vital importance to them. In Dusch, the scheme, while giving
rural areas a significant voice, nevertheless gave majority representation
to the urban areas that contained most of the population. The Court will
almost certainly demand that a majority of the population in any system
keep a majority voice even if the minority is given representation greater
than its mere numbers call for.
Thus, one solution to an inflexible and unjust application of the
one man, one vote rule in a fact situation involving local districts is
the use of residency requirements for political candidates. Avery leaves
unanswered the problem of exactly what type of residency require-
ments will satisfy the equal protection principle. The facts of Dusch
perhaps give the best indication of what the Court may be willing to ac-
cept if a valid and non-discriminatory reason underpins the scheme. In
Mandicino v. Kelly, 4 the Supreme Court of Iowa, in the month follow-
ing Avery, struck down a residency scheme under which a city with
eighty per cent of a county's population could elect only two of the resi-
dent supervisors on the five-member county board. However, the Iowa
court was careful to distinguish this fact situation from that in Dusch. 5
The Iowa decision, as does Avery, has strong implications for a
North Carolina local reapportionment case pending in Gaston County.36
" See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), which held that the Georgia
Senate was properly apportioned. In that case, senators in certain large counties
entitled to more than one senator could be nominated and elected by the county
at large; but they were required to live within districts in the county. The Court
deemed senators elected by an entire county to be representatives of the entire
county
c t Iowa , 158 N.W.2d 754 (1968). Cf. Secretary of State v. Bryson,
244 Md. 418, 224 A.2d 277 (1966).
- Iowa at -, 158 N.W.2d at 763.
=' See the newspaper article, cited note 7 supra, for more details and back-
ground on the suit.
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Gaston's Board of County Commissioners presently consists of six mem-
bers elected at large, but each one must reside in a different township. 7
The townships allegedly vary substantially in population, with the larg-
est-the city of Gastonia-containing 45 per cent of the total county
population and the smallest having only six per cent. 8 While each town-
ship doubtless can point out valid policy reasons for being individually
represented on the county board, the facts listed above appear much
closer to Mandicino v. Kelly than to Dusch. Were Gaston County in
some way to insure majority representation to the two townships having
the large majority of the population, the North Carolina Supreme Court
might decide that there would be no constitutional objection to the plan ;"O
but Gaston County's present scheme is almost certain to be held violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.40
The broad language of Avery can clearly be misapplied to vitiate its
policy of meaningful representation for citizens on the local level. Later
in the month in which Avery was handed down, a federal court in Gor-
don v. Meeks applied it to uphold an Alabama law against "single shot"
voting.41 The plaintiff contended that the law denied him equal pro-
tection, since it in effect forced him to vote for certain candidates for
Birmingham's city council whom he found unacceptable, or find his
ballot for one or two candidates invalidated. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals turned the reasoning of Avery against the plaintiff and held
that it would not permit "single shot" voting since the plaintiff's vote
for one council position would count more than another's who voted to
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-5 (Supp. 1967).
" Complaint at 3, Jacobs v. Gaston County, Gaston County Super. Ct. (1968).
" See generally Hobbs v. County of Moore, 267 N.C. 665, 149 S.E.2d 1 (1966),
where the North Carolina Supreme Court approved residency requirements for
five of seven members of the county board of education that were to be elected
by the county at large. Because two members could reside anywhere in the
county, and because two more had to live in the two cities in the county, the
urban areas could elect four of the seven board members. Because all mem-
bers were elected at large, the urban areas also had a voice in the selection
of the other three. The suit in Gaston County is based upon Woodard v. Carteret
County, 270 N.C. 55, 153 S.E.2d 809 (1967). The North Carolina Supreme Court
there said the issue of whether the one man, one vote principle is applicable to
county commissioners is justiciable in the North Carolina courts.
,0 See generally Sanders, Equal Representation and the Board of County Com-
mnissioners, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, April, 1965, at 1, for a discussion of tile effect
the one man, one vote rule is likely to have on various counties in North Carolina.
The author predicts that the United States Supreme Court may eventually go so
far as to hold that residency requirements on the local governmental level must
be predicated on districts of substantially equal population. This, of course, might
well destroy the flexibility the Court approved in Ditsch and Sailors.41 394 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
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fill every seat.42 There was little doubt that the Alabama law was on the
books to keep Negroes from "single shot" voting one of their race onto
the city council. The court's application of Avery probably denied a
significant racial minority a chance to gain at least one voice on Bir-
mingham's city council. However, Avery dealt with a completely dif-
ferent circumstance than "single shot" voting, and it need not have been
applied in such an inflexible manner to the set of facts found in Gordon.
The court in Gordon actually took a portion of the language in Avery
out of context to support its decision. 3
Even in a situation where it is applied too rigidly, such as in Gordon,
the one man, one vote rule has a saving feature. In American life there
is really no such thing as a monolithic majority with one or a few over-
riding interests. "[T]he majority is but a coalition of minorities which
must act in a moderate, broadly representative fashion to preserve itself.""
In other words, the political majority cannot long ignore various mi-
nority interests in governing without offending all or some of the many
minorities of which it itself is composed. Thus, there is a strong argu-
ment that the one man, one vote concept-while not perfect-nevertheless
is the best rule in a representative democracy, even on the local level of
government with its many complex governing bodies. But it should not
be applied in inappropriate situations, as was done in Gordon, and the
courts should apply it flexibly, using the rationale of Dusch where ap-
posite.
TiHOMAS F. LOFLIN III
Criminal Law-United States v. Jackson and Its Impact Upon
State Capital Punishment Legislation
INTRODUCTION
The provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act subject a defendant to
the risk of death if he is tried by a jury, but to no more than life imprison-
"Id. at 4.
Compare the paragraph in which the court in Gordon quotes Avery, 394
F.2d at 4, with the actual context of that language in Avery itself, 390 U.S. at
480-81.
" Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote,
One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 52.
'18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964) provides that:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, ab-
1969]
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ment if he waives a jury trial or pleads guilty. In United States v. Jack-
son,' the district court held that the threat of death "made costly" the
assertion of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial, and was thus an
impermissible burden upon the free exercise of that right. On appeal,8 the
Supreme Court of the United States not only agreed that the statutory
scheme violated the sixth amendment right to a jury trial," but indicated
that the statute was also violative of the fifth amendment right "not to
plead guilty."'
The significance of the district court opinion was apparent from the
ensuing litigation' and commentary,' and, as predicted, the Supreme Court
ducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except,
in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by death if
the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of
the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years
or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
The Federal Kidnapping Act had withstood no less than eight challenges, on various
grounds, to its constitutionality. Livers v. United States, 185 F.2d 807 (6th Cir.
1950) (failure to specify a minimum penalty does not render § 1201(a) uncon-
stitutional) ; Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945) (the phrase "liberated
unharmed" is not so indefinite as to render § 1201 (a) unconstitutional); United
States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1940); Waley v. Johnston, 112 F.2d 749
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 649 (1940) (failure to specify a maximum term
of imprisonment does not render § 1201 (a) unconstitutional); Bates v. Johnston,
111 F.2d 966 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 646 (1940) ( § 1201 (a) is not un-
constitutional for failure to specify a maximum term for which an offender may be
punished) ; Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1938) ( § 1201 (a) is a
valid exercise of the commerce power); Kelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 847 (10th
Cir. 1935) ( § 1201(a) is a valid exercise of the commerce power); Bailey v.
United States, 74 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1934) ( § 1201(a) is a valid exercise of the
commerce power)
'262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967).
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Jackson rationale has also
been applied to invalidate the death penalty provisions of the Federal Bank Robbery
Act. Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
' By Constitutional mandate, one accused of a crime has the right to a jury trial
except in cases of impeachment. E.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) ;
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) ;
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The essential elements of a
trial by jury are derived from the common law: (1) a jury consisting of twelve
men; (2) trial in the presence and under the supervision of a judge having power
to instruct the jury as to the law and advise them in respect to the facts; (3) a
unanimous verdict. E.g., United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936); Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
; 390 U.S. at 581. It is well settled that due process forbids a conviction on the
basis of a coerced guilty plea. E.g., Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
' See Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); McDowell
v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Tenn. 1967); Laboy v. New Jersey, 266
F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1967); Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146 (W.D.
Ky. 1967) ; Spillers v. State, - Nev. -, 436 P.2d 18 (1968).See Note, The Federal Kidnapping Act is Unconstitutional in That It Impairs
the Free Exercise of the Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury, 5 HOUSTON L.
REv. 166 (1967); Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Right to a Jftry
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decision has provided a basis for challenges to state capital punishment
legislation. While Jackson has been readily applied by some courts,8 it
has engendered considerable hostility in other forums.' The purpose of
this note will be to comment on the Jackson decision and upon its im-
plications for state statutory schemes that impose the death penalty
through procedures that are arguably within the scope of its rationale.
The Jackson Decision
In Jackson the defendants were indicted in the district court under the
provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act."° Section 1201 (a) of the Act
authorized punishment "(1) by death if the kidnapped person has not
been liberated unharmed," and if the verdict of the jury shall so recom-
mend, 2 or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the
Trial, 53 IowA L. REv. 206 (1967); Comment, Criminal Law--Jury Discretion
Over Death Penalty--Unconstitutioiality of Section (a) of the Federal Kidnapping
Act, 12 N.Y.L.F. 668 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 12 N.Y.L.F. 688
(1966)]; Comment, United States v. Jackson: The Possible Consequences of I11-
pairing the Right to Trial by Jury, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 167 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 167 (1967)]; Note, 1 SUFF. L. Rv. 130
(1967).
8 Alford v. North Carolina, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1968); Spillers v. State, -
Nev. -, 436 P.2d 18 (1968); State v. Harper, - S.C. -, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968).
' State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968) ; State v. Peele, 274 N.C.
106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968).
0 See note 1 supra.
"The provision invoking the death penalty only when the victim is not liberated
unharmed was included in the statute as an inducement to the kidnapper to release
his victim unharmed. E.g., Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945) ; United
States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 103 F.2d 857 (3rd Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939); Finley, The Lindberg Law, 28 G~o. L.J. 908
(1939); Bomar, The Lindberg Law, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 436 (1934).
"2 Various policy considerations have been advanced for allowing only a jury to
impose the death penalty. In Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J.
1967), it was suggested that the policy was not only to provide fairness for the
defendant, but also to relieve the trial judge of the onerous burden of imposing the
death penalty himself. It has also been stated:
The practice of jury sentencing is most often explained as a desire to preventjury nullification and a rejection of the mandatory death penalty concept.
First, juries will often acquit or return verdicts for lesser crimes to avoid
the death penalty notwithstanding the evidence of guilt. This practice, at the
very least, frustrates the legislative intent and points dramatically to inad-
equacies in the law. By giving the jury control over the punishment, it can
render its verdict on the merits of the case, without fear of the consequences.
Second, the rejection of the policy that death sentences are mandatory for
crimes which provide for the death penalty was concomitant with the accep-
tance, by legislatures, of the fact that some acts, which constitute capital of-
fenses, do not merit the death penalty. This is reflective of the overall move-
ment away from capital punishment.
Where the death penalty has remained, it is almost always a discretionary
matter for the jury.
Comment, 12 N.Y.L.F. 688, 691-92 (1966).
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death penalty is not imposed."' Since only the jury could impose the
death penalty, a defendant could either completely preclude or substantial-
ly reduce the risk of death by successfully waiving his rights to a jury
trial or by pleading guilty.14 Relying on the rationale of Griffin v. Cal-
ifornia,5 in which it was held that a prosecutor's comment on a defen-
dant's failure to testify "made costly" his fifth amendment right to silence,
the district court reasoned that the "assertion of the equally fundamental
right to trial by jury is made no less costly"' by the threat of death. The
court then stayed the effectiveness of its judgment in order to allow an
appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to the pro-
visions of 18 U.S.C. § 3731.1
On appeal the Government questioned the defendant's reliance on the
1318 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964) (emphasis and footnotes added).
In Waley v. United States, 233 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
896 (1956), it had been suggested that a plea of guilty would preclude imposition
of the death penalty, and presumably the same would be true in the event of a waiver
of jury trial. However, in the earlier case of Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d
742 (7th Cir. 1938), it had been held that in the event of a guilty plea it was within
the discretion of the trial judge to impanel a jury for the purpose of determining
punishment. The same reasoning would seem to apply in cases where a defendant
had waived jury trial. However, the district court in Jackson reasoned: "[E]ven
if the trial court has the power to submit the issue of punishment to a jury, that
power is discretionary, its exercise uncertain." United States v. Jackson, 262 F.
Supp. 716, 717-18 (D. Conn. 1967). Thus the defendant who pleads guilty or waivesjury trial is at least insulated by the discretion of the trial judge from jury-imposed
capital punishment, while the defendant who submits the issue of guilt to the jury
has no such protection. The district court thus found the possible conflict between
Waley and Seadlund to be immaterial in that under either: "If defendants claim
their fundamental Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial . . .they must risk their
lives. That risk is at least substantially reduced if defendants waive their consti-
tutional right to jury trial by claiming trial to the court or by pleading guilty." Id.
at 717. For a penetrating analysis of the relative risks under both the Waley and
Seadlund interpretations see Comment, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 167 (1967). The Su-
preme Court finally resolved the conflict in statutory interpretation in favor of the
Waley case.
Waiver of a jury trial must be affirmatively and intelligently made and requires
the consent of the court and the prosecution. FED. R. CRIM. P, 23(a); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930). A defendant in the federal system also has no absolute right to
plead guilty. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
1 380 U.S. 609 (1965). The Griffin rationale has been reaffirmed by the Su-
preme Court in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (an attorney who asserted
his right against self-incrimination at a judicial inquiry into his professional con-
duct may not be disbarred), and applied in a number of state and federal decisions.
E.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967): Moraro v. United States, 374
F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); State v. Turner, 429 P.2d 565 (Ore. 1967).1 United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Conn. 1967).
17 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964) allows the Government to make a direct appeal to
the United States Supreme Court when a decision setting aside an indictment in a
criminal proceeding is based on the invalidity of a federal statute.
[Vol. 47
UNITED STATES v. JACKSON
Griffin rationale. Its contention was that intentional comment on a de-
fendant's silence inures to the benefit of the prosecution, while requiring
jury authorization for the death penalty operates as an alternative to man-
datory capital punishment, thus having an ameliorative effect and inuring
to the benefit of the defendant. The Government took the position that a
statutory scheme implemented to mitigate the severity of punishment
should not be invalidated because of an incidental and unintentional in-
ducement to forego constitutional rights.1 8 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, emphasizing that the desirable policy underlying jury-imposed cap-
ital punishment 9 could be implemented by alternative statutory schemes
that do not penalize those who assert their right to a jury trial or to refrain
from pleading guilty. As the Court observed, there are statutes which
leave the decision on capital punishment to a jury in every case, regardless
of how guilt is determined. For example, in cases where a defendant is
convicted after trial by a judge or upon a plea of guilty, statutes could
authorize the impaneling of a jury convened especially for the purpose of
passing on the propriety of capital punishment. Thus all defendants would
be subjected to an equal risk of death, regardless of whether their guilt
had been determined by jury, judge or upon their own admission. With
this and other available alternatives,"° which implement capital punishment
in such a way that there is no inducement to forfeit valuable constitutional
rights, the question became not whether the inducement was "incidental
rather than intentional,"'" but whether it was "unnecessary and therefore
excessive.""
Even if the threat of death did act as an inducement to waive jury
trial or to plead guilty, the Government argued that the trial judge's
power to reject coerced waivers or guilty pleas would act as an effective
safeguard.23 However, the Court saw the problem as not necessarily one
of coerced guilty pleas and waivers, but rather that the statute "needlessly
encourages them."2 4 Thus, while the power of rejection may "alleviate
" Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, n.1; Brief for Appellant at 6-9, United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
" The policy considerations which underly the practice of allowing only a jury
to impose capital punishment are enumerated in note 12 supra.
2 For other suggested schemes see Comment, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 167, 195-96
(1967).
21 390 U.S. at 582.
" Id.2 As previously pointed out, a defendant has no absolute right to waive jury
trial or to plead guilty. See note 14 supra.
"' 390 U.S. at 583 (emphasis added).
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* . . it cannot totally eliminate"2 5 the improper inducement which is in-
herent in § 1201 (a) of the Federal Kidnapping Act.
In a last attempt to uphold the constitutionality of the Act, the Gov-
ernment submitted the alternative proposal that all federal judges should
be instructed to refuse to accept any waiver of jury trial or guilty plea in
a kidnapping case.2 6 Admittedly this alternative would subject all defen-
dants to an equal risk of death, and thus eliminate any unconstitutional
incentive to forego trial by jury or to plead guilty. But it would also have
the undesirable effect of forcing all defendants to submit to a full trial
on the merits. The Court was not receptive to this proposal. It empha-
sized that it would be "cruel" to require a trial of those defendants who
prefer not to contest their guilt, and that the automatic rejection of all
guilty pleas would "rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility."127
However, the Court held that the unconstitutionality of a part of the
statute did not necessarily render the remaining portion invalid. The
offensive portion could be severed from the remainder unless analysis of
the legislative intent indicated otherwise."' The Court held that the death
penalty provision was a "functionally independent" part of the Act, and
that it could be severed, leaving the remainder in full force.
The Aftermath of the Jackson Decision
Following the Supreme Court decision in Jackson, defendants were
quick to attack other statutory schemes in which the operative effect was
similar to that of the Kidnapping Act. State v. Harper,29 State v. Peele,30
and State v. Forcellae' are three post-Jackson cases in which state courts
have been faced with challenges to their states' capital punishment stat-
utes, and in Alford z. North Carolina32 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to pass upon the issue. While there
are minor variations in each state's statutory scheme,"3 two characteristics
25 Id.
" Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Jackson, 290 U.S. 570 (1968).
27 390 U.S. at 584.
2' If the unconstitutional provisions of a statute are severable from the rest in
such a way that the legislature would be presumed to have enacted the valid portion
without the invalid, then the entire statute will not be held unconstitutional. See 16
Am. JuR. 2 D Constitutional Law § 186, at 414-15 (1962).
- S.C. -, 162 S.E.2d 712 (1968).
274 N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1968). The Peele decision was followed in
Parker v. State, 1 N.C. App. 27 (1968), and State v. Spence, - N.C. -,-
S.E.2d -, (1968). But see Alford v. North Carolina, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1968),
in which the court of appeals disagreed with the Peele decision.
'52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968).
32 F.2d - (4th Cir. 1968).
The South Carolina statutory scheme is as follows:
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are common to all: (1) upon conviction the death penalty is mandatory,
unless the jury recommends life imprisonment; (2) a defendant may
enter a plea of guilty (or non vult under the New Jersey statute), which,
if accepted, will preclude imposition of the death penalty. Thus, unlike
Punishment for murder-Whoever is guilty of murder shall suffer the pun-
ishment of death; provided however, that in any case in which the prisoner
is found guilty of murder the jury may find a special verdict recommending
him to the mercy of the court, whereupon the punishment shall be reduced
to imprisonment in the Penitentiary with hard labor during the whole lifetime
of the prisoner.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-52 (1962).
Sentencing in cases of guilty pleas-In all cases where by law the punishment
is affected by the jury recommending the accused to the mercy of the court,
and a plea of guilty is accepted with the approval of the court, the accused
shall be sentenced in like inanner as if the jury in a trial had recommended
him to the mercy of the court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-553.4 (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added). The North Carolina
statutory scheme for the crime of rape is as follows:
Every person who is convicted of ravishing and carnally knowing any female
of the age of twelve years or more by force and against her will, or who is
convicted of unlawfully and carnally knowing and abusing any female child
under the age of twelve years, shall suffer death: Provided, if the jury shall
so recommend at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the punish-
ment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the court shall
so instruct the jury.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953).
(a) Any person, when charged in a bill of indictment with the felony of
murder in the first degree, or burglary in the first degree, or arson, or rape,
when represented by counsel whether employed by the defendant or appointed
by the court under G.S. 15-4 and 15-5, may, after arraignment, tender in
writing, signed by such person and his counsel, a plea of guilty of such
crime; and the State, with the approval of the court, may accept such plea.
Upon rejection of such plea, the trial shall be upon the defendant's plea of
not guilty, and such tender shall have no legal significance.
(b) In the event such plea is accepted, the tender and acceptance thereof
shall have the effect of a jury verdict of guilty of the crime charged with
recommendation by the jury in open court that the punishment shall be im-
prisonment for life ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-162.1 (1965) (emphasis added). The New Jersey statutory
scheme is as follows:
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree.., shall suffer death
unless the jury shall by its verdict... recommend life imprisonmnt, in which
case this and no greater punishment shall be imposed.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-4 (1951) (emphasis added).
In no case shall the plea of guilty be received upon any indictment for mur-
der, and if, upon arraignment, such plea is offered, it shall be disregarded,
and the plea of not guilty entered, and a jury, duly impaneled, shall try the
case.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the accused from pleading non vult
or nolo contendere to the indictment; the sentence to be imposed, if such plea
be accepted, shall be either imprisonment for life or the saine as that imposed
upon, a conviction of murder in the second degree.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-3 (1951) (emphasis added). (N.J STAT. ANN. § 2A:
113-4 (1951) provides for a maximum sentence of thirty years imprisonment for
a conviction of murder in the second degree).
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the Kidnapping Act, under these statutes the possibility of death does
not turn on whether trial is by a jury or by the court. Indeed it cannot,
for apparently none of these states allow a defendant to waive jury trial
in a capital case.34 Thus, while the Kidnapping Act 6ffered two avenues
of escape from the death penalty-by either a waiver of jury trial or by
a guilty plea-the latter is the only means of escape for the state defen-
dant.
Since the accused must be tried, if at all, by a jury, the Forcella court
saw the sixth amendment as irrelevant, the issue being not the right to a
jury trial, but rather the "right to defend."3 Thus the sole basis for
challenging the New Jersey statute was deemed to be whether the induce-
ment to plead guilty violated the fifth amendment.
The language of Harper indicates that the South Carolina court was
also cognizant of the distinction recognized in Forcella, for the court
stated that:
The death penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act were
declared unconstitutional because the death penalty under the Act was
"applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest
their guilt before a jury."
The question before us then is whether the provisions of our statutes
render the death penalty for murder ... applicable only to those de-
fendants who assert the right to plead not guilty.36
And, although in Peele the distinction is less clearly articulated, it seems
that the court there was also dealing in terms of only the fifth amend-
ment.3
7
" In North Carolina "no person shall be convicted of any crime but by the
unanimous verdict of a jury . . .in open court." N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 13. This
right cannot be waived. E.g., State v. Muse, 219 N.C. 226, 13 S.E.2d 229 (1941);
State v. Hill, 209 N.C. 53, 182 S.E. 716 (1935). The New Jersey court expressly
stated: "Indeed the right to trial by jury cannot be waived." State v. Forcella, 52
N.J. 263, -, 245 A.2d 181, 184 (1968). Apparently jury trial could not have been
waived in the Harper case either, for the South Carolina court stated: "[H]ere-
after.., the choice between life imprisonment and the death penalty must be left
... to the jury in every case.., regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been
determined, whether by the verdict of the jury or by a plea of guilty." State v.
Harper, - S.C. -, -- 162 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1968) (emphasis added).
52 N.J. at -- 245 A.2d at 185.
- S.C. at -- 162 S.E.2d at 713 (emphasis added).
The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that:
We think there are certain material differences in the Federal Kidnapping
Act and in North Carolina Statutes 14-21 and 15-162.1, and that Jackson
is not authority for holding the death penalty in North Carolina may not be
imposed under any circumstances for the crime of rape. In the kidnapping
act the law fixes imprisonment in the penitentiary, but provides that the jury
may impose the death penalty. The North Carolina rape statute provides
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Both the South Carolina and the North Carolina courts read Jackson
as holding that § 1201 (a) of the Kidnapping Act was repugnant not only
to the sixth amendment right to jury trial, but that it was independently
violative of the fifth amendment right "not to plead guilty." Recognition
of the two independent bases for invalidation of § 1201 (a) was expressly
stated in the Peele decision.3" It is implicit in the result reached in Harper,
for the court summarily observed that if the South Carolina statutes ren-
dered the death penalty applicable only to those defendants who plead not
guilty, "then the Jackson decision renders . . . the statutes in question
unconstitutional . ... -3 However, the Forcella court took a different
approach. It recognized that there were two possible grounds on which
§ 1201(a) could have been held unconstitutional, and the court con-
ceded the fact that the statute was a clear violation of the sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial." But it was unwilling to interpret Jackson
as holding that there was a separate and independent violation of
the fifth amendment right "not to plead guilty." Since the fifth amend-
ment was considered the only basis on which the New Jersey scheme could
be challenged, it was held that Jackson did not implicate the state statute.
In Alford, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in the
course of rejecting the Peele decision and applying Jackson to inval-
idate the North Carolina statutory scheme,4' also disagreed with the
Forcella interpretation. Not only did the circuit court read Jackson as
that the death penalty shall be ordered unless the jury, at the time it renders
its verdict of guilty, as a part thereof fixes the punishment at life imprison-
ment. True, G.S. § 15-162.1 provides that a defendant charged with rape,
if represented by counsel, may tender a plea of guilty which, if accepted by
the State with the approval of the Court, shall have the effect of a verdict of
guilty by the jury with a recommendation the [sic] punishment be life im-
prisonment. The State, acting through its solicitor, may refuse to accept the
plea, or the judge may decline to approve it. In either event, there must be
a jury trial, although the facts are not in serious dispute.
State v. Peele, 274 N.C. 106, 111, 161 S.E.2d 568, 572 (1968).
"8 "The Jackson case holds the death penalty provision of the kidnapping act
... violates fundamental rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 110, 161 S.E.2d at 571.
3"- S.C. at--, 162 S.E.2d at 713.
40 52 N.J. at -, 245 A.2d at 184.
" In addition to holding that the North Carolina statutory scheme was invalid,
the circuit court went two steps further. In Jackson the Supreme Court indicated
that the mere fact that a defendant may plead guilty to a charge under the Kid-
napping Act does not necessarily render his plea involuntary and require reversal
of the conviction. Alford involved a habeas corpus proceeding in which the defen-
dant contended that his plea of guilty to second degree inurder had been coerced by
the threat of death, which would have existed had he asserted his right to trial on
the issue of first degree murder. From a review of the record the circuit court was
satisfied that petitioner's guilty plea had been motivated by the desire to avoid the
risk of death and that such a plea was involuntary.
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rendering the death penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act
unconstitutional on two separate grounds, but, contrary to the position
taken in Forcella, Peele, and Harper, the court held that the state statutes
in question could be challenged on both grounds. As to the first point the
circuit court seems correct. The Forcella court's interpretation that the
Kidnapping Act was not a separate and independent violation of both the
fifth and sixth amendments seems a bit tenuous, particularly in light of
some of the express language of the Jackson opinion. For example, the
Supreme Court, in speaking of the death penalty provision of the Kidnap-
ping Act, stated: "The inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course,
to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty
and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury
trial."'42 And later in its opinion the Court stated that "the evil in the
federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waiv-
ers but simply that it needlessly encourages them. '43 In each instance
the Court spoke in terms of both the fifth and sixth amendments, and in
view of this language it is difficult to accept the Forcella court's interpre-
tation.
In respect to the circuit court's second point-that the state statutes
may involve sixth as well as fifth amendment infirmities-the question is
not so easily resolved. As previously noted,44 under none of the state
statutes involved can a defendant waive his right to be tried by a jury
and thereby secure trial by the court. If a defendant decides to contest
his guilt, trial must be by a jury. For this reason the Forcella opinion
expressly, and Harper and Peele by implication, treat the sixth amend-
ment right as irrelevant, the only issue being whether the inducement to
plead guilty violates the fifth amendment. It is arguable that the right
to defend necessarily encompasses the right to defend via jury trial. But
as a practical matter the jury trial-judge trial alternative can arise only
after the initial decision to contest guilt. Furthermore, if the right to a
jury trial is automatically violated by impeding the right to defend, then
it may be argued with equal validity that other rights, such as the right
of confrontation, are also impaired.
The Necessity of Balancing Conflicting Interests
Even if the Alford court was correct in its interpretation that the
state statutes could be challenged on both fifth and sixth amendment
4390 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added).
'
3 Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
"See note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
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grounds, there still may be a basis for questioning the applicability of the
Jackson decision. The Court in Jackson emphasized that the inducement
inherent in the Kidnapping Act was needless and unnecessary. This was
so because the statutory alternative of allowing a jury to decide upon
capital punishment in every case, regardless of how guilt is determined,
could retain the policy of jury-imposed capital punishment and at the
same time make the risk of death equal for all defendants. However, it
may be that the alternative scheme will have the effect of destroying
other policy considerations. If this is true, then the inducement was not
needless or unnecessary, and these policies must be weighed against the
degree of inducement.4
5
There are, of course, valid policy reasons for maintaining the practice
of allowing only a jury to impose the death sentence. The Jackson Court
observed that limiting the death penalty to cases in which the jury recom-
mends death avoids the more drastic alternative of mandatory capital
punishment.46 Further, having only the jury as the sentence-imposing
body relieves the trial judge of the onerous burden of imposing the death
sentence himself. It has also been suggested that when juries have no
control over sentencing they will often acquit or return verdicts for lesser
included offenses, notwithstanding evidence of guilt, in order to avoid
the possibility that the defendant will receive the death sentence. By hav-
ing control over punishment the jury can render its decision on the
merits without fear of the consequences.4 7
Recognizing the validity of allowing only the jury to impose death,
the Jackson Court noted that there are statutes that authorize a jury to
decide on the issue of punishment in every case, regardless of how guilt
is determined.4 8 Under such a scheme the risk of death would be equal
for all defendants and no premium would be placed upon waiving a jury
trial or on pleading guilty.
At this point it would be tempting to conclude summarily that there
was actually no need to balance conflicting interests in the Jackson case-
"' The evil inherent in the Federal Kidnapping Act was that its operative effect
conditioned jury trial upon acceptance of the risk of death, thus discouraging
the assertion of fifth and sixth amendment rights. Courts have shown increasing
concern that constitutional rights may be chilled by the infliction of judicially or
legislatively imposed penalties upon defendants who elect to exercise them. See
Comment, 22 RUTGERS L. RPv. 167, 172 (1967). Implicit in these decisions is the
proposition that if the particular procedure that imposed the penalty served legit-
imate functions, then the utility of those functions must be weighed against the
procedure's inhibiting effects.
390 U.S. at 581-82.
,7 See note 12 supra.
"390 U.S. at 582.
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that the burden on the assertion of constitutional rights was needless-
because the statutory scheme recommended in lieu of § 1201 (a) would
eliminate the conflict. But such a conclusion would be premature with-
out inquiry into the possible collateral effects of the proposed alternative
scheme. It must be remembered that the procedural device of waiving
trial by jury in order to obtain trial by the court, while not expressly em-
bodied in the terms of § 1201 (a), is, nevertheless, part and parcel of the
total statutory scheme. Thus inquiry must be made into whether adoption
of the alternative scheme would in any way destroy the reasons for allow-
ing waiver of jury trial.49 More simply stated, would the practice of
allowing a jury to impose death following trial by the court be destructive
of the reasons for allowing a waiver in the first place? In addition, it
must be determined if there are valid policy considerations which will be
thwarted if death is allowed to be imposed following a guilty plea.
It is generally recognized that there are situations in which an accused
may feel that he will be better protected by choosing trial by the court
rather than submitting his case to a jury. For example, a defendant
may feel that a judge is more capable of understanding a complex case
and of rendering an intelligent verdict. ° Trial by the court may give the
accused the opportunity to make a fuller presentation of his case because
the judge will be more likely to relax the normal rules of evidence. 1 In
addition there is the very real possibility that certain factors that might
prejudice a jury will not sway the conditioned objectivity of a trial
judge.52 It would seem that none of these policy considerations would in
any way be subverted by submitting the issue of capital punishment to
a jury subsequent to a guilty verdict rendered by the court.
However, there are valid policy considerations that may be destroyed if
the death penalty is allowed following a guilty plea. One policy favoring a
death-free guilty plea can be illustrated by a review of the historical develop-
ment of capital punishment legislation in New Jersey. Prior to 1893 death
was mandatory upon a conviction of murder in the first degree, 3 and in ac-
"Waiver of jury trial is provided for by FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
o Note, Waiver of Trial Jury in Felony Cases in Kentucky, 48 Ky. L.J. 457,
461 (1960).1Id. at 461-62.2Id. at 462-63.
The 1893 act was intended to ameliorate the course of capital punishment.
Prior thereto, the penalty for murder in the first degree was mandatorily
death, and if a defendant was convicted on confession in open court, the court
had to "proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the
crime and give sentence accordingly."
52 N.J. at -, 245 A.2d at 188.
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cordance with the common law rule the death penalty could be imposed
upon a plea of guilty.54 However, judges were reluctant to impose death
upon a defendant's own admission and often advised them to retract the
plea and submit to trial.55 In 1893 the legislature abolished the plea of
guilty and authorized a plea of non vult, the sentence being the same as
that imposed upon a conviction of second degree murder. In 1917 legis-
lation was passed that eliminated mandatory capital punishment, giving
the jury the authority to recommend life imprisonment. At the same time
the penalty upon a plea of non vult was increased to life imprisonment.
It can be seen, then, that the catalyst for adoption of the non Vult
statute was simply a reluctance to impose the death sentence upon a de-
fendant's own admission. Thus the statute "served to 'substitute for the
advice of the judge the mandate of the law, that the citizen shall not be
adjudged to death upon his own confession, but that ... the state shall
prove in all respects to the satisfaction of a jury the crime laid in the
indictment.' ",57 Apparently the Forcella court lost sight of the underlying
policy that prompted the enactment of the non vult statute when it argued
that the statute "was intended to benefit murder defendants, permitting
the court.., to accept a plea which would bar the death penalty."5" The
point is that the statute was not intended to provide a ready means of
escape from the risk of death. Had the legislature thought the death pen-
alty inappropriate it could have simply eliminated it. The non vult statute
was merely a manifestation of legislative intent that the defendant who
pleaded guilty should not suffer death. Of course, like § 1201 (a) of the
Kidnapping Act, the statute has the collateral effect of allowing defendants
to escape the death penalty. In this respect it can be argued, as indeed it
was in both Forcella and Peele, that statutes of this type are "beneficial." 9
' At common law a defendant could enter a plea of guilty to any offense with
which he was charged and apparently the court was bound to accept the plea if
entered into voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences. See MODEL
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 225 (Official Draft, 1930), comment and cases
cited therein.
"' "[J]udges from the earliest times, abhorring to enter a death judgment on a
defendant's admission, generally advised prisoners to retract the plea and to plead
to the indictment." 52 N.J. at -, 245 A.2d at 188.
Id. at -- 245 A.2d at 188-89.
Id. at -, 245 A.2d at 188.
Id. at -, 245 A.2d at 189.
"The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that:
G.S. 15-162.1 is primarily for the benefit of a defendant. Its provisions may
be invoked only on his written application. It provides that the State and the
defendant, under rigid court supervision, may, without the ordeal of a trial,
agree on a result which will vindicate the law and save the defendant's life.
274 N.C. at 111, 161 S.E.2d at 572. Both the Peele and Forcella courts also argued
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This line of reasoning presupposes that leniency to those who otherwise
would have been put to death outweighs the inducement of guilty pleas
from defendants who otherwise would have been successful6" in con-
testing their guilt. While analysis of this intriguing question is beyond
the scope of this note, suffice it to say that there are few executions in
this country, and for this reason the Forcella court's conclusion that a
"justified leniency for the many"6 should weigh more heavily is far from
clear. While the Jackson Court did not engage in an express analysis
of the relative benefit and burden, it is arguably implicit in the decision
that this balance has been struck, and that elimination of the inducement
outweighed any possible "benefit" to defendants as a class. But even
though the Jackson decision itself seems to preclude use of the "benefit"
rationale, it is still obvious that the Court's suggested alternative scheme
is diametrically, opposed to the notion that a defendant should not be put
to death upon his own admission.
If the death penalty is to be allowed upon a defendant's own admission,
then the practical effect may be a substantial reduction in the incidence of
use of the guilty plea.' A defendant who pleads guilty would stand
forewarned that he automatically faces the possibility of death. On the
other hand, a defendant, by asserting his right to trial, would be assured
that no punishment could be imposed unless the prosecution sustained the
burden of affirmatively proving his guilt. Thus the possibility of an
acquittal would insulate him from direct exposure to punishment, and
even if he were convicted following a trial, the possible sanctions would
that the trial judges's power to reject coerced guilty pleas would act as a safeguard.
However, the Jackson Court expressly repudiated this line of reasoning.
" In addition to acquittal, "successful" in this context means conviction of a
lesser included offense, or a lighter sentence than would have been imposed had
the defendant pleaded guilty.
52 N.J. at -, 245 A.2d at 188.
Empirical support of this hypothesis would be desirable, but precise data on
guilty pleas are difficult to establish. It has been estimated that ninety per cent of
all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty. D. NEWMAN, THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 4 (1966). However, the percentage of
guilty pleas in capital cases is substantially lower. A recent three year study in
California, a state in which death may be imposed following a guilty plea, indicated
that in murder cases there was a 32 per cent disposition by guilty plea. See J.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SO-
CIETY 113 (1966). Even this statistic may be misleading if it is taken as an indicator
of the number of defendants who plead guilty in the face of a possible death sen-
tence, for a portion of the 32 per cent may have entered the plea with the under-
standing that the prosecutor would not seek or the judge impose the death sentence.
It would be interesting to compare the California statistics with those from a state
that had a death-free guilty plea. While such data has not been found, it seems
that the percentage of defendants who avail themselves of the death-free plea would
be much higher.
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be the same as they would have been on a guilty plea-either death or
life imprisonment. Under this analysis, unless it could be shown that for
some reason the probability of receiving the death sentence rather than
life imprisonment would be substantially greater following a trial on the
merits, a defendant would have much to gain and nothing to lose by
contesting rather than admitting his guilt.
Concomitant with a reduction of guilty pleas is the erosion of many
of the policy considerations upon which the plea is based. The additional
burden on our already crowded courts that would result from a reduction
of guilty pleas testifies to the need for maintaining the expediency that
the plea lends to the guilt-determining process. And, quite apart from
notions of expediency, it has been suggested that the determination of
guilt without trial serves a number of other values.' It thus becomes
paradoxical that Jackson, a decision in which the Court expressly recog-
nized the utility of the guilty plea, 4 may have the practical effect of
discouraging guilty pleas.
Since abolition of the death-free guilty plea may be destructive of
legitimate interests, then the value of these interests should be weighed
against the statutory scheme's inhibiting effect upon constitutional rights.
In striking this balance it is significant to observe that the degree of
inducement under the state statutes seems far more severe than that
of the Kidnapping Act."5 Under the provisions of the Kidnapping Act
03
[T]he plea provides a means by which the defendant may acknowledge his
guilt and manifest a willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct.
Also, in some cases the plea will make it possible to avoid a public trial when
the consequences of such publicity outweigh any legitimate need for a public
trial. Pleas to lesser offenses make possible alternative correctional measures
better adapted to achieving the purposes of correctional treatment, and often
prevent undue harm to the defendant from the form of conviction. Such
pleas also make it possible to grant concessions to a defendant who has given
or offered cooperation in the prosecution of other offenders.
... Such pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real disputes and,
consequently, to reduce the need for funds and personnel.... Moreover, the
limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has
grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningful-
ness of the presumption of innocence.
It may thus be concluded that the frequency of conviction without trial
not only permits the achievement of legitimate objectives . . . but also en-
hances the quality of justice in other cases as well.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2-3 (Tent. Draft 1967).
0" See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
"Brief for Appellant at 9, Alford v. North Carolina, - F.2d - (4th Cir.
1968). The circuit court in Alford agreed with appellant's contention. "Greater
encouragement is inevitable in a New Jersey-type statute than in the federal stat-
utes held invalid ... in Jackson . . . ." Alford v. North Carolina, - F.2d - -
(4th Cir. 1968).
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a defendant had two avenues of escape from the death penalty-lie
could either plead guilty, or plead not guilty and waive jury trial.
Under the latter alternative an accused could thus avoid the death penalty,
while still retaining the right to contest his guilt. Thus, it would seem
that a defendant who could escape the death penalty by agreeing to contest
his guilt before a judge rather than a jury would be under little pressure
to plead guilty. However, such is not the case in the context of the state
statutory schemes. Under them the guilty plea is the only avenue of
escape, and thus there is an inherently greater inducement to plead guilty.
Of course the most desirable solution (assuming a negative view as
to the propriety of capital punishment) would be to abolish the use of the
death penalty. Even the Jackson Court fell short of this. But an analysis
of the legislative history of the Kidnapping Act did enable the Jackson
Court to conclude that Congress would not have chosen "to discard the
entire statute if informed that it could not include the death penalty clause
now before us." 6 The answer was thus to sever the death penalty pro-
vision and leave the remainder of the Act as operative law, with the
maximum penalty being life imprisonment. However, severance may not
be the answer for many state court schemes. For example, the Forcella
court pointed out the New Jersey dilemma: "[W] e could hardly accept
the extraordinary proposition that the 1893 act or the 1917 act, or any
general revision of the laws, spelled out an intent that the death penalty
should fall if the introduction of the non vult plea created a constitutional
impasse."
01 7
Conclusion
In Jackson the Court stated that the provisions of the Federal Kid-
napping Act needlessly encouraged waivers of jury trial and guilty pleas.
Alternative statutory schemes can eliminate the inducement to forego
these rights and at the same time preserve the policy reasons for having
jury-imposed capital punishment. It is submitted, however, that the sug-
gested alternative scheme may be destructive of other policies that favor
a death-free guilty plea. It may be that "other values come into play and
. . . demonstrate that the incidental impact . . . is not 'needless' .... 6,1
The inhibiting effect of these statutes should be balanced against the policy
that forbids imposition of the death penalty upon a defendant's own ad-
mission, and against the undesirable impact upon the administration of
06 390 U.S. at 586.67152 N.J. at -, 245 A.2d at 191.8Id. at -, 245 A.2d at 186.
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criminal justice that a reduction in guilty pleas would surely entail. It is
therefore arguable that Jackson should not be read as a per se invalidation
of state statutes such as the ones in question. With the abundance of
litigation that the Jackson decision is engendering, the Supreme Court
will undoubtedly have ample opportunity to address itself to these issues.
JAMES G. BILLINGS
Domestic Relations-Complementary Adjudication of Marital
Incidents in Divorce Proceedings
The recent decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Fleek v.
Fleek' illustrates once more that insisting that a divorce action and its
incidents be made to fit precisely the traditional in rem-in personam
categories may obscure the truly relevant jurisdictional factors inherent
in divorce litigation.
Her husband having toured Switzerland and Italy some twelve years,
Mrs. Fleek, a North Carolina domiciliary, sued in Durham County for
divorce and child support. In accordance with the statute providing for
service of process in proceedings "for ... divorce ... or other relief in-
volving... domestic status.. .,,,2 she published notice in the local news-
papers and sent copies of the complaint and summons to his last known
addresses. While granting her ex parte divorce, the trial court declined to
order child support on the basis that the statute did not authorize a
judgment in personam on such service. In affirming, the supreme court
stated that "the court is without power to enter a judgment in personam.
unless and until the defendant is before the Court in person, that is, by
personal service of process, or by a general appearance before the Court."3
The underlying jurisdictional problem here is whether something more
than domicile of the plaintiff-spouse-a sufficient basis, assuming due
process notice out of the state, for jurisdiction to grant the divorce-is
required to render valid a child support order against the absent spouse.
The court's decision is technically correct; the statute invoked did not
specifically authorize an exercise of jurisdiction on substituted service
in the child support aspect of the case.' But to the extent the opinion
1270 N.C. 736, 155 S.E.2d 290 (1967).
'N.C. GEm. STAT. § 1-98.2(3) (Supp. 1967).
8270 N.C. at 738, 155 S.E.2d at 292.
'As a matter of simple statutory interpretation, no fundamental quarrel can
be made with a holding that the language, "service of process by publication or
19691
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suggests that statutory authority for such an exercise of jurisdiction
could not constitutionally be given, serious questions may be raised. The
opinion reveals a continuing commitment to rigid traditional in rem-in
personam categories of jurisdiction that events have long since discarded.
So long as these categories have of necessity been used, divorce ac-
tions have been considered in rem, concerning a relationship (the res)
created or maintained within the state." But the natural incidents of that
relationship-property and support rights, for example-have continued
to be considered in personam.0 When the plaintiff in an ex parte divorce
proceeding on constructive service of process has also demanded a money
judgment, the court, after rendering its decision determining the con-
tinuing validity of the marital status, has considered itself without power
to enter a personal judgment against the absent defendant; the service of
process that was sufficient to raise jurisdiction over the marriage status
was deemed insufficient to raise jurisdiction to adjudicate a personal
obligation arising out of that status. Thus while a spouse might be able
to have her marriage ties severed by the state of her domicile, it has re-
mained quite possible that she would have to pursue her partner into a
foreign state to secure a property settlement. Courts insisting upon the
categorization of marital incidents within the in personam-in rem frame-
work have thus committed themselves to the problems of divisible di-
vorce-the incomplete adjudication of marital estates, the deprivation of
support for the children of that estate, and the inconvenient judicial ad-
ministration resulting from a multiplicity of suits.
The intransigence of this approach has long been recognized. "While
jurisdiction over individuals and over corporations has, because of a
willingness to reexamine the relevant factors, been able to break away
from the inadequate concept of 'power' as the sole basis of jurisdiction, a
similar reExamination has not occurred with regard to the concept of the
marital res in the field of divorce jurisdiction."' 7 Although the rule in
service outside the state may be had in... proceedings... (3) ... for... divorce
... or for any other relief involving the domestic status of the person to be
served.. .,," does not include child support. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-98.2(3) (Supp.
1967).
'A. EHRENZWEIG & D. LOUISELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL § 7, at 57-59(2d ed. 1968); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 612-13 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as JAMES]; cf. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262 (1907) (constructive
service sufficient because owners usually keep themselves informed of what concerns
their property).
8 Shonk v. Shonk, 16 Ohio Misc. 123, 241 N.E.2d 178 (1968).
" Developments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 971
(1960).
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Williams v. North Carolina,' that a court may adjudicate the continuing
validity of the marital relationship whenever the bona fide domicile9 of
one of the spouses is established to be within the state, has facilitated
divorce of absent spouses, it has also given rise to the anomaly of divisible
divorce. Under the Williams rule, the possibility arises that that same
court considered to have sufficient interest to adjudicate divorce is never-
theless without power to adjudicate the incidents of the marriage. Such
an attitude seems less a solution to the problem than a refusal to rec-
ognize it. A better approach would say:
The only legal question for our concern in this case is whether the other
aspect of, and indeed an incident to, a proceeding for divorce, the prop-
erty arrangement, is similar enough to the dissolution of the marital re-
lation, with respect to both the interests of the parties and the nature of
what is adjudicated, that constitutionally it may be treated alike.' 0
Even within the traditional categorization of divorce litigation with-
in the in rem-in personam framework, divorce actions can constitutionally
be adjudicated more completely than was Fleek. Generally speaking, both
the North Carolina legislature and court" have been advertent to ex-
panding notions of jurisdiction 2 that have departed from an earlier
philosophy requiring physical power over the defendant in order to sub-
ject him to personal jurisdiction.' Satisfaction of the "minimum con-
tacts" test and compliance with the requirements of due process, adequate
8 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
'A man has only one domicile, but he may have many residences. See Texas
v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 432 (1939) ; cf. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296
U.S. 268, 275 (1935).
"0 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 423 (1957) (dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
" See, e.g., Shepherd v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 460, 106 S.E.2d 704,
709 (1959).
'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also, Mil-
liken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294
U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Jaftex Corp. v. Ran-
dolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
" E.g., Thomas v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 266 N.C. 523, 146 S.E.2d 397
(1966) (substituted service not ipso facto invalid on mere showing defendant not
personally served within the state); Harrison v. Hanvey, 265 N.C. 243, 248-49,
143 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1965) (constructive service valid if shown defendant left
state to defraud creditors or avoid service of process); Surratt v. Surratt, 263
N.C. 466, 139 S.E.2d 720 (1965) (had defendant, in alimony case, been shown a
resident, constructive service would have been valid); Ewing v. Thompson, 233
N.C. 564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951) (affirming constitutionality of nonresident motorist
statute); Cape Fear Rys. v. Cobb, 190 N.C. 375, 129 S.E. 828 (1925) (substituted
service on local sales agent of foreign corporation sufficient to establish jurisdiction
over that corporation).
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notice and opportunity to be heard,"4 have become the modern requisites
for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporations,6
nonresidents found to be doing business within the state,'0 nonresident
motorists, 7 and residents who had departed the state with intent to de-
fraud creditors or to avoid service of process. 18 More recently, the draft-
ers of the new North Carolina jurisdiction statute,'9 enacted in conjunc-
tion with the adoption of the new North Carolina Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, cited these developments' ° in basing that statute on the fun-
damental state interest in the litigation and general principles of fairness
and reasonableness.
That a court may with justification insist on more than simply the
domicile of the plaintiff-spouse as a jurisdictional basis for marital inci-
dent orders is not disputed. Indeed, the court might reasonably conclude
that major problems of forum shopping by far from innocent spouses,
encouraged by the notorious laxity in the divorce laws of some states,
would tax such a framework beyond the benefits to be derived in terms
of judicial efficiency. But where that something extra does exist-a
spouse who has fled the state following culpable conduct,22 or simply an
absent domiciliary, for instance-the court need not hesitate to exercise
personal jurisdiction on the basis of these additional contacts with the
marital relationship. This would take into account the modern factors of
fairness and reasonableness in the determination of personal jurisdiction,
and it would leave the court free to determine in each case whether the
asserted domicile gives the state sufficient contact with the marriage, as
a matter of due process, to assert personal jurisdiction over its partners
with respect to the various incidents of the marriage.
Substantial difficulties may arise in any subsequent attempt to enforce
Mr. Fleek's child support obligation, and in any event it will require an
additional venture into court. Satisfactory resolution of the issue might
" See JAMEs § 12.8, at 642-43; Allen, What's New in the Law: Choice of Law
... Greatest Interest Rule, 54 A.B.A.J. 918 (1968); Kurland, The Supreme Court,
The Due Process Clause and In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm.
L. REv. 569 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-97(5) (1953).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1967).
"
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-98.2(6) (Supp. 1967).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75 (1967) (effective July 1, 1969).
" GEN. STATUTES CoMMISSION, PROPOSED N.C. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 111
(1966).
21 1d. at 112.
"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-98.2(6) (Supp. 1967).
"
3Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955).
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legitimately have been possible in the previous divorce action, had a dif-
ferent statute24 been invoked or had the court felt obliged to consider
the problem in the light of fairness and due process and opportunity to be
heard. The state's interests lie largely on the side of prompt and effective
safeguarding of the children's welfare,5 which seems sufficiently related
to the marriage relationship to justify treatment along with its adjudi-
cation, once the court has affirmatively determined the contacts and reason-
ableness issues. Such an approach would certainly then satisfy the state's
interest in assuring the integrity of its domestic institutions, while pro-
viding for the cleanup of those litigious problems often arising out of
marital estrangement.
The policy and trend in the law of jurisdiction has favored the ex-
pansion of the concept of personal jurisdiction to the limits of fairness
and reason. It is to be hoped that the dictum in Fleek does not indicate
an intransigent attitude, which, by "labelling the action with the question-
begging phrase 'in personam,' ,7 will always deny a forum to plaintiff-
spouses whose husbands are, for whatever reason, absent from the state.
ROBERT L. EPTING
Eminent Domain-An Expansion of the Definition of Taldng
While it has been axiomatic since 1897 that state and municipal gov-
ernments are bound by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to justly compensate for property taken for public use,1 the concep-
tual problems involved in defining "taking" and "public use" have created
uncertainty2 and, in some cases, caused injustice.8 It is clear that the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-98.2(6) (Supp. 1967) (departed debtor).
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948). See also State v. Bell, 184 N.C.
701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922) (divorce can neither terminate a father's relationship to
his children nor his continuing obligation to support them). North Carolina stat-
utory law also reflects the state's interest in the issue of child support. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-325 (1953) (making nonsupport criminal); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 52A-6 (1953) (making nonsupport an extradictable offense).
JAMES § 12.8, at 642-43.
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 423 (1957) (dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
' Chicago, B. & O.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
'See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37-42 (1964),
tracing the conflicting views of Justices Harlan and Holmes on the question of
what constitutes a "taking" and introducing the original conflict between the doc-
trinal and functional or utilitarian approaches to "taking." See also 1 J. LEwis,
EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1900). The author states: "[When we come to seek
1969l
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public policy demanding flexibility in land use precludes any purely for-
malistic definition of "public use."'4 Thus, the term has outgrown the
early restrictive requirement that the property sought be destined for
actual "public employment." Rather, it has acquired an updated, policy-
oriented "public benefit" aspect.' Although there has been an ever-broad-
ening and socially responsive definition of "public use," the concomitant
has not been true of the concept of "taking."'  Certainly "taking" has
changed from the antiquated view that government must assert an actual
proprietary interest in the property before an owner may demand com-
pensation.' The modern view is that any substantial interference with
private property that destroys or significantly lessens its value is a "tak-
ing," even though title in the owner remains undisturbed.8 But this
seemingly broad definition has tended to be restricted and, on occasion,
has failed to protect adequately private property from some of the aber-
rations of increased eminent domain power.' However, there have been
several recent decisions that indicate that a new and broader definition
of "taking" may be developing to aid the property owner.' In the most
recent of these cases, Sayre v. United States," the court approached
"taking" with what appeared to be a doctrinal definition,12 but which,
upon closer scrutiny, proved utilitarian in application.
for the principles upon which the question of public use is to be determined, or
to define the words, 'public use,' in the light of judicial decisions, we find ourselves
utterly at sea." Id. at 410.
8 For a survey of the reasons which most courts give for making the owner
of property absorb the depreciation in the value of his land created by a taking of
adjacent land, see 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.441 [1] (3d rev. ed.
1963) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
'See Morris, The Quiet Legal Revolution: Eminent Domain and Urban Re-
development, 52 A.B.A.J. 355, 356 (1966).
'Id.; Comment, Urban Renewal: Acquisition of Redevelopment Property by
Eminent Domain, 1964 DUKE L.J. 123, 125; Note, Real Property-Eminent Do-
main -The Public Use Requirement, 46 N.C.L. REv. 663 (1968).
'See 26 Am. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 158 (1966) (concluding that the mean-
ing of "taking" is of decreasing importance).
'See Sax, supra note 2, at 37-42.8Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 567 (Ct. Cl. 1965); 2 NICHOILS
§ 6.3.
' See Dolle, Impending Condemnation and Stultification of Use, 3 REAL PROP.,
PRo. & TRUST J. 106 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Dolle].
" Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1967) ; Foster v. City
of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966); City of Cleveland v. Carcione,
116 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
11282 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
'" The term "doctrinal" is used to indicate an approach to the law wherein
concepts are created into which facts must fit to enable the rule of law to apply.
This provides certainty, but it does not provide well for change in circumstances
nor does it facilitate policy decisions. Conversely, "utilitarian" is used to indi-
cate a functional approach that is dynamic but provides little certainty.
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Sayre involved the use of eminent domain power in urban redevelop-
ment, an area of governmental power that has been substantially aug-
mented by the expansion of the "public use" doctrine.13 Pursuant to the
Housing Act of 1949,'1 the Cleveland, Ohio, City Planning Commission
sought in January, 1961, to obtain federal funds under a grant and loan
contract by adopting an urban renewal plan.'5 After approval of the plan,
the defendant City of Cleveland initiated the University-Euclid Urban
Renewal Project I by sending notices to the residents and owners of the
affected area of its intent to acquire their property.' 6 Subsequently, the
city made "prominent and frequent public announcements and publication
through all local media of public communication of its intention to appro-
priate the properties."' 7 Yet the city, thereafter, acquired only a small
amount of the properties. At the same time, by following normal eminent
domain procedure 8 and denying any compensation for repairs to prop-
erty, the city effectively denied area owners, one of whom was the plain-
tiff's bankrupt, Liberty Mortgage Company, the right to repair their
swiftly deteriorating realty.'9 On November 2, 1964, the Liberty Mort-
gage Company was declared bankrupt.20 At that time the City of Cleve-
land had acquired not more than twelve of the scores of the company's
properties within the project area.21
On these stipulated facts, the federal district court held as a matter
of law that the city had abused its eminent domain power to an extent
that amounted to a pro tanto "taking."'2 In apparent ratification of the
doctrinal method, the court marshalled facts from the complaint which
fulfilled the required elements of conceptual taking-governmental inten-
tion to appropriate and governmental action amounting to appropria-
tion.3 However, the paucity of facts upon which the court relied, coupled
's Morris, supra note 4, at 355-56.
"42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
', 282 F. Supp. at 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (1964), requiring the local
government to approve an urban renewal plan for an area before any funds are
made available.
" 282 F. Supp. at 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1964), providing that "no
land for any project to be assisted under this subchapter shall be acquired by the
local public agency except after public hearing following notice of the date, time,
place and purpose of such hearing."
'282 F. Supp. at 179. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(e) (1964).
See Dolle.
"282 F. Supp. at 179.
0I"d.
21LId.
2 Id. at 192.
23 Id. at 184, 185.
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with the court's slight deviation from precise conceptualism, reveals the
actual utilitarian approach of the opinion.
Quoting from Biggs Realty Co. v. United States,24 the court in Sayre
stated that " '[t]o constitute a taking there must be an intent on the part
of the [defendant] to take plaintiff's properties, or at least an intention
to do an act the natural consequences of which was to take property.' ,,26
In Foster v. City of Detroit,26 upon which Sayre most heavily relied,
finding intent had been easy, since that fact was established by the com-
pletion of the appropriation proceedings.17 Thus, the court in Foster
merely had to decide at what point in time the taking had occurred. How-
ever, in Sayre the eminent domain proceedings, though commenced in
accordance with law, had never been concludedI and this complicated
the question of intent.' The court held that publication of notices to the
effect that the city intended, at some future time, to procure plaintiff's
properties was sufficient to establish an intention to do an act the natural
consequences of which was to take property. 0 This then was the first
crack in the doctrinal wall surrounding the concept of "taking." The
"natural consequences" test for intent introduced an element of reason-
able expectation into the concept of "taking," and like most tests of reason-
ableness, it allowed for balancing policy considerations. Could not the
City of Cleveland reasonably expect that publication of the notices, fol-
lowed by city inaction, would result in the gradual abandonment by ten-
ants of the Liberty Mortgage Company's properties within the project
area and subsequent vandalism of the vacated properties? The outcome
in Sayre hinged upon the answer to that question. However, to analyze
the concept of "taking," it is the formulation of that question that is
crucial.
Even with the intent to appropriate established, the court in Sayre
had to find some act by the city sufficient to implement that intent. Again
the court relied upon the reasoning in Foster3 and concluded that Cleve-
land, by initiating steps to appropriate the bankrupt's properties without
the proper planning for completing the appropriation, had abused its
24353 F.2d 1013 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
25282 F. Supp. at 185.
28 Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 660 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
282 F. Supp. at 185. See Committee on New Developments in Real Estate
Practice, Inverse Condemnation, 3 REAL PaOP., PROB. & TRUST J. 173, 175 (1968).8 282 F. Supp. at 185.
"2 See Inverse Condemnation, supra note 27, at 176.
" 282 F. Supp. at 185.
" Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 664 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
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power. 2 However, the court stated that abuse of power alone was not
enough to constitute an act of taking, where there had been no formal
condemnation proceedings, unless that act of abuse "directly and prox-
imately contributes to, hastens, and aggravates, acting alone or in com-
bination with other causes, the deterioration and decline in value of the
area and the subject property."33 The court required this element of
causation to fulfill the concept of "taking."
The court rendered its decision that the required concepts of intention
and action were fulfilled by the facts pleaded and that they constituted a
taking for which there had to be just compensation. But what were the
crucial facts? The City of Cleveland published the notices of intent to
acquire and then did nothing, and as a result there occurred the rapid
depreciation of bankrupt's properties. Upon these same crucial facts, the
law prior to Sayre was well settled that "land is not damaged or taken
in a constitutional sense by reason of preliminary proceedings looking
to its appropriation for a public use." 4 Furthermore, one district court,35
in a widely quoted opinion,36 had expressly rejected the proposition that
the institution of condemnation proceedings could lead to such an inter-
ference with private property rights as to constitute a taking:
The reasoning seems to be that the very filing of this suit interferes
with the normal freedom of an owner to use and dispose of his prop-
erty. But such interference is inherent in all condemnation proceedings.
No case has been cited or found which supports the view that the con-
demnation action itself constitutes a taking. The court finds no merit
in it.37
The court in Sayre, under the guise of conceptualism, has clearly promul-
gated a definition of "taking" that creates new law at least with reference
to the conduct of eminent domain proceedings in urban redevelopment
situations. This law stands as a warning to local governments that they
must not abuse their power of eminent domain in substance or procedure,
so as to injuriously affect private property.
The utilitarian effect of this expanded definition of taking is twofold.
First, it will help correct the major fault current in the eminent domain
" 282 F. Supp. at 192.
Id. at 185.
"26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 168 (1966). See also 2 NICHOLS § 6.13
[3]; Dolle 107.
" Government of the Virgin Islands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F. Supp.
495 (D.V.I. 1960).
"See, e.g., 2 NICHOLS § 6.13 [3] n.9; Dolle 107.
185 F. Supp. at 498.
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
power-procedural inadequacy. 8 Second, it will prevent what has been
called "stultifying the use of property"39 and thereby protect private prop-
erty rights more fully.
The inadequacies current in eminent domain procedures seem to be
a by-product of the expanded "public use" doctrine. That doctrine has
increased local government's power over land use while, simultaneously,
federal funds have become increasingly available under the Housing Act of
1949. These developments have created an atmosphere that encourages in-
creased use of eminent domain power, thereby effectuating society's need
for land development. 40 Although these tendencies have resulted in a great-
er volume of public land acquisition, the methods for handling this increase
have been left largely to the ingenuity of the local governments, except for
those general guidelines upon which the federal grants are conditioned. 41
The strain on local procedures is most obvious in cases like Sayre and
Foster, where property remains subject to condemnation for long periods
of time.42 Hence the mandate of the court in Sayre seems designed to
make local governments either increase the number of personnel handling
their existing condemnation procedures to accommodate this increased
volume or renovate these procedures so that each acquisition might be
more efficiently accomplished. To implement this mandate, the court
establishes a definition of "taking" that will permit each property owner
to redress procedural abuse to his property by demanding compensation
for unreasonable delay in appropriation that results in demonstrable loss.
The stultification of land caused by impending condemnation usually
manifests itself in two forms.4" Either the owner is unable to sell his
property because of public knowledge that it may be condemned, or he is
effectively prevented from developing it by governmental denial of com-
pensation for repairs. Thus, fundamental rights to control property are
divested by the initiation of eminent domain proceedings. And the longer
those proceedings take, the greater is the owner's deprivation. Conse-
quently, the holding in Sayre, by demanding more expeditious condem-
nation procedures, also protects the owner's right to use his property as
he wishes.
Perhaps the expansion of the concept of "taking" in Sayre can best
be attributed to an abstract need to strike a balance between the public
, See Comment, Urban Renewal, supra note 5, at 124.
Dolle 106.Comment, Urban Renewal, supra note 5. See Morris, supra note 4.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (1964).
42282 F. Supp. at 178-79 (four years) ; 254 F. Supp. at 660 (thirteen years).
Dolle 106.
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good and the individual's right to be free from injury. As the ex-
pansion of the "public use" doctrine has greatly augmented govern-
ment's power to implement the former, Sayre seems to be a reaction to
this power increase, thereby protecting the latter. However, by protecting
the individual's rights, Sayre has not impaired the public's interest, for
the streamlining of eminent domain procedures assures a quicker imple-
mentation of that interest while avoiding any accelerated deterioration
of the property that is the subject of that interest.
KENNETH B. Hipp
Federal Jurisdiction-The Delimitation of Erie
and a Redefinition of "Laws"
In Ivey Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph,1 plain-
tiff brought an action in federal court to recover damages for negligence
and breach of contract in the rendition of interstate telephone service.
Diversity of citizenship not being present, both the complaint and a
counterclaim for charges due for the same services were dismissed. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that federal
common law was applicable and that the district court had original
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2
Reversing the normal order of analysis,' the court first held that fed-
eral law was controlling. It found that the field of interstate communica-
tions had been preEmpted by the federal government, especially where
the outcome of the case might adversely affect the federal policy of uni-
formity of rates.4 The court held that a congressional policy of uni-
formity of services could be implied from the congressional policy of
uniformity of rates embodied in the Interstate Communications Act of
1 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'g 234 F. Supp. 4 (N.D.N.Y. 1964).
'28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where-
in the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.
'Usually the courts treat the jurisdictional question first because there is a
presumption that the court lacks jurisdiction until it is shown that it has juris-
diction over the subject matter. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 14 (1963).
'See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-Good-
win Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919).
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1934.' In the absence of federal statutory law governing negligence and
breach of contract in interstate communications contracts, the federal
law to be applied was that derived from federal judicial decisions. The
court then interpreted the word "laws" in § 1331 to include such judi-
cial decisions as a basis for original jurisdiction in the federal judicial
system. The federal courts were thereby given jurisdiction where "the
dispositive issues stated in the complaint require the application of fed-
eral common law .... ,,o The cases requiring this application of federal
common law are those in which "a distinctive policy of an Act of Con-
gress requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim."'7
This unusual approach by the court is indicative of the interrelation-
ship between the jurisdictional issue and an important judicial devel-
opment-the delimitation of the Erie' doctrine by the federal courts.,
This development originated in a reexamination of federal judicial com-
petence by the federal courts.1° The basic finding of that reexamination
was that the federal judiciary possesses the necessary competence to de-
cide the rules of law to be applied in cases which are primarily concerned
with the operation of congressional programs. Erie is read as holding
only that there is insufficient federal judicial competence in those areas
in which state law is in no way attributable to federal authority.1 Pro-
fessor Mishkin has gone so far as to say: "Such [federal judicial] com-
petence is essential to the effective implementation of the legislative pow-
ers committed to the national government by the Constitution."' 2
The result of the new approach to Erie and federal judicial com-
petence is the growth of a body of "specialized common law"' as op-
posed to the "federal general common law" that Justice Brandeis declared
in Erie to be beyond federal judicial power. 4 This "specialized federal
'48 Stat. 1064, as amended 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).8391 F.2d at 492.
Id. at 493.
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines of
the State Law in the Federal Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955); Comment,
Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74
YALE L.J. 325 (1964); Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law,
53 COL-um. L. REv. 991 (1953); Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Sur-
vival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946).
"
0 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
" Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
" Id. at 797.
" Friendly, supra note 9, at 405.
1 304 U.S. at 78.
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common law" is applied in areas so controlled by federal statutory laws
that the courts can claim that those statutory laws, or the federal policies
that they embody, are the source of federal judicial authority.
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.:5 and Textile Workers
Union of America v. Lincoln Mills"' exemplify the application of "spe-
cialized common law" in areas dominated by federal statutory law. The
decisions in these two cases effectuate congressional policy and protect
it from possible contravention by state laws. In Sola, the Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiff, in responding to a counterclaim, could not in-
voke a state common law doctrine estopping the licensee of a patent from
challenging its validity. If the state estoppel doctrine had been applied
the licensor of an invalid patent would have been able to enforce a price-
fixing stipulation in a license. Such an arrangement would have been
in conflict with the Sherman Act.1 7 By applying the federal estoppel
doctrine the Court allowed the defendant to challenge the validity of the
patent and thus the validity of the price-fixing stipulation. It thereby
helped protect and effectuate the federal policy against price restrictions
not protected by a patent monopoly. Sola was in the federal courts on
diversity of citizenship, but the courts have similarly applied "specialized
common law" to effectuate a congressional policy where jurisdiction was
based on a federal question. 8 In Textile Workers, the Supreme Court
interpreted a jurisdictional statute as a license to construct a whole body
of federal common law governing labor arbitration. The majority of
the Court claimed to be implementing the federal policy of promoting
industrial peace and orderY In both cases federal policy was controlling
even though there was rio specific statutory law governing the issue in
controversy. 4
The negligence and breach of contract issues in the Ivey case are similar
to issues in cases that are affected by the delimitation. The issues arise in
federally preempted areas and are not precisely covered by a federal stat-
ute. Also, the resolution of the issues may adversely affect a federal
policy. The principle to be drawn is that the federal courts will apply
federal common law to fill the interstices of congressional legislation in
order to effectuate congressional policy in federally preempted areas.20
' 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
16353 U.S. 448 (1957).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
"
8E.g., O'Dench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v.
Greany, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
'° 353 U.S. at 452-56.
.0 Comment, Erie Limited, supra note 9, at 565.
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The federal courts feel particularly qualified to make this application
where the decision calls for uniformity of rules or involves the inter-
pretation of federal statutes or the intent of Congress21
In cases where this delimitation is operative, original federal juris-
diction becomes an asset, if not a necessity. Its value can best be seen by
examining the consequences of the alternative solution the Ivey court
might have accepted.2" Since the state courts can be required to apply
federal law where applicable,' the court could have allowed the negligence
aid breach of contract issues to arise through the state courts, with the
Supreme Court reviewing any cases that might not conform with the
desired uniform federal standard. This solution would face a potential
problem of statutory interpretation, for the statute,24 which, in such cir-
cumstances, accords the Supreme Court its appellate reviewing power,
uses the word "statutes" instead of "laws." Thus, state decisions turning
on federal judicial law would not appear to be reviewable. However, in
reviewing state decisions interpreting judicially created maritime law,
the Court seems either to have ignored the problem or not to have had
it called to its attention.2 5
The alternative approach via state court litigation would also raise
the practical problem of the grounds upon which review could be sought.
With no written law established, an attorney would be placed in the
unenviable position of claiming that a state decision did not conform to
an as yet non-declared federal standard. In such a situation few litigants
would want to spend the time or money appealing; thus, the state court
decisions would be left as controlling in most cases. To undertake so
large a task as the creation of a whole body of contract law through this
slow process would leave the federal law undeclared for an indefinite
period of time. Original jurisdiction 'for the lower federal courts would
speed the development of an acceptable, uniform body of law and insure
that federal principles controlled. There would be less need for review
of lower court decisions since these courts, by virtue of their more fre-
quent exposure to the problems of federal programs and congressional
plans, would be better qualified to deal with them.26
211d.
12 Such an alternative was proposed by the appellants. Brief for Appellants
at 10, Ivey Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).2'Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
2128 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1964).
"Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L. REv. 817, 824 n.36 (1960).
" Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Court, 53 COLUm. L. Rnv.
157, 195 (1953).
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The Ivey court, seeing the need for such original jurisdiction, ex-
tracted the reasoning from Justice Brennan's dissent in Romero v. In-
ternational Terminal Operating Co.2 7 and made it the basis of their de-
cision. Justice Brennan had argued that the word "laws" in § 1331
encompasses judicial decisions as well as statutes.28 He argued that juris-
diction should be determined by the law that created the cause of action
--whether statutory or judicial.2 9 In Romero, the court neither accepted
nor rejected Justice Brennan's argument." The court in Ivey read the
majority in Romero as holding only that since the Federal Judiciary Act
of 18751 was intended to give the federal courts a new content of juris-
diction, it did not apply to maritime law over which they already had
jurisdiction.3 2
There are valid arguments for and against Justice Brennan's inter-
pretation. The Ivey court points out that the new interpretation is in
accord with the purpose behind the Act of 1875,' s which was to create
a forum specifically to protect federally created rights. If the federal courts
are going to make judicial law in the absence of statutes in federally
preempted areas, the causes of action under those decisional laws should
be accorded the same weight as causes of action arising under statutory
law. In this respect the new interpretation embodies the idea that it is
the source of the law-state or federal-and not the form that is
of primary importance in deciding jurisdictional issues. There should be
no distinction drawn between statutory and judicial law for jurisdictional
purposes.
It can also be argued that the Supreme Court has almost found that
federal jurisdiction can be acquired where a federal statute and its policy
require that federal principles control the issues. In Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers," the emphasis placed on
federal policy by the Court and its references to Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States35 might be taken as indicative of a willingness to find that
jurisdiction could be based on judicially created rights.
, 358 U.S. 354, 389 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).28 Id. at 393.
20 Id.
" Justice Brennan argued for his interpretation again in Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 653 (1963). Once again the majority did not accept or reject his
argument; it based its decision on a finding of no federal cause of action.
", Federal Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
" 391 F.2d at 493.
""See ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 77-79 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1967).
"'323 U.S. 210 (1944).
""318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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The fact remains, and weighs most heavily against the new interpre-
tation, that in interpreting § 1331 no federal courts have ever used the
word "laws" to mean judicial decisions." Thus, there is neither sub-
stantial authority nor precedent for the inclusion of judicial decisions in
the definition of "laws." It is true that in Erie the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Rules of Decision Act37 as including judicial decisions in
addition to statutory enactments." But there the Court was reacting to
evidence 9 that it believed made clear a congressional intent that the word
"laws" be read to include judge-made law. The analogy is even further
weakened by the holding in the case.40 To accept the new interpretation,
the Supreme Court will have to find a meaning in statutory language
that neither the courts nor the Congress have found for almost a hundred
years.
The future of the development of federal common law is uncertain.
What is certain, however, is that if the development expands it will create
an even greater need, and serve as further justification, for federal lower
court jurisdiction in those cases controlled by federal principles. It will
strengthen the attitude that it is the source of the law, not the form, that
is controlling. This will tend to make the federal courts the overseers of
the expansion of jurisdiction. In this respect, and also in their efforts
to protect and effectuate congressional legislation, the federal courts are
retreating from an established policy of leaving the extension of federal
powers to the Congress. 1 The delimitation of Erie and the finding of
original federal jurisdiction in this case indicate that federal law is no
longer solely an interstitial product, building normally upon legal rela-
tions established by the states, but has a force and authority all its own . 2
BEN F. TENNILLE
Only two courts have expressly excluded judicial decisions from the definition
and one of those was an admiralty case. Foster v. Herly, 330 F.2d 87, 90 (6th
Cir. 1964); Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 667 (3rd Cir. 1950) (admiralty).
Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73.3 8304 U.S. 64, 66-67 (1938).
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1924).
,0 Note, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction to Maritime Clains:
A New Jurisdictional Theory, 66 HARv. L. REv. 315, 324 n.86 (1955).
'
1 Mishkin, supra note 11, at 814 & n.64.
"Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
543, 545 (1954).
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Insurance-Liability of Insurer Beyond Policy Limits-
The Danger of Strict Liability
A, the owner of a 10,000 dollars liability insurance policy with com-
pany X, is sued by B. Pursuant to the insurance contract, the company
undertakes the defense of the lawsuit, controlling all aspects of the litiga-
tion including the right to settle. An offer to settle the case for the pol-
icy limits is made, which the insurer rejects. At the trial the jury awards
the plaintiff a verdict of 100,000 dollars. After company X pays its
10,000 dollars, the defendant A is liable for the remainder of the judg-
ment. A brings an action against the company for wrongful refusal to
settle within the policy limits.
This fact situation, presented to the California Supreme Court in
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,' confronts the parties to the insurance
contract with an inherent conflict of interests. Since under the terms of
the policy the insurer reserves the exclusive right to settle claims, an of-
fer by the plaintiff at or near the policy limits gives rise to conflicting
desires. "The insurer is interested in settling the claim at the lowest
amount within the policy limit, while the insured desires to avoid any
liability for the excess."' In affirming an award for the excess judgment
and for 25,000 dollars for the insured's mental suffering,' the California
court carefully considered the arguments for a strict liability rule in this
area.4 Simply stated, a strict liability rule would provide that "whenever
an insurer receives an offer to settle within the policy limits and rejects
it, the insurer should be liable in every case for the amount of any final
judgment whether or not within policy limits."5 After considering argu-
ments for this proposed rule, the court declined "to determine whether
there might be some countervailing considerations ...because ...the
evidence' is clearly sufficient to support the determination [under the
166 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
'Terrell v. Western Cas & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 827-28 (Ky. 1968).
'The award of 25,000 dollars for mental suffering raises an interesting ques-
tion of whether damages for wrongful refusal to settle are to sound in contract
or tort. Discussion of this point, however, is not within the scope of this note.
See generally Note, Excess Recovery-Liability Insurer Who Refused Settlement
Within Policy Limits Held Liable for Excess Recovery and Mental Damages,
43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 199 (1968); Note, Refusal to Settle Claim Below Policy Limits
-Damages for Mental Suffering, 22 Sw. L.J. 374, 377-79 (1968).
'There were a large number of amicuts curiae briefs filed supporting the pro-
posed rule.
66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
'The evidence was that the insurer knew that there was a strong likelihood
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bad faith doctrine] ."7
The California court is apparently the first court to give a strong
indication that it might promulgate a strict liability rule in the excess
judgment context.' While all courts hold that an insurance carrier will
be liable for a wrongful refusal to settle under certain conditions," the
basic split heretofore has involved the question of whether the company
is liable for mere negligence0 in refusing to settle or solely for a bad
faith" refusal. The central issue under either standard concerns the
weight the carrier must give to the interests of the insured in determin-
ing not to settle. "The predominant majority rule is that the insurer must
accord the interest of the insured the same faithful consideration it gives
its own interests . *... , Although the tests will vary in terminology,
most writers agree that the distinction between the negligence and bad
faith standards is minimal,'" for the insurer, as a professional in insurance
litigation, is often held to a higher standard than the average practition-
er.'" Consequently, mere negligence by the average defender might con-
stitute bad faith by the skilled insurer.'5
of a large excess judgment. Its only hope of a favorable verdict was proof of the
injured party's prior mental history. "Security was putting blind faith in the
power of its psychiatrists to convince the jury when it knew that the accident
could have caused the psychosis. .. " Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 18.
"Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (footnote added). These
arguments will be discussed later in the note. See generally Comment, Liability
of Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 95
(1949); Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurer's Failure to
Settle: A Move Toward Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WAsH. L. REV. 799(1968); Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Neg-
glience Ride, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475 (1966); Note, Liability Insurer's Duty to
Settle, 13 U. CHaI. L. REv. 105 (1945).
' Some courts have considered the doctrine and have rejected it. E.g., Kaudern
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967).
'See generally Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675 (2d
Cir. 1963): 7A J. APPLE:MAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRActicE §§ 4712-13 (1962,
Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN]; Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955);
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. Rrv.
1136 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; Note, Inssurer's Liability for Refitsal to
Settle, 42 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 544 (1968).
" E.g., Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968).
"E.g., Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968).
2 Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 470, 134 A.2d 223, 228
(1957).
" See 7A APPLEMAN § 4712; Annot., supra note 9; Keeton.
"State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Ky.
1967); accord, Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857
(1968).
" 7A APPLEMAN § 4712. Following this reasoning one court has stated that
"[T]he insurer is simply held to a standard of reasonable conduct and avoidance
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An analysis of case law reveals that under both the good faith and
negligence standards, no one factor is determinative of liability. A list-
ing of relevant considerations includes the following:
(1) the strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of li-
ability and damages; (2) attempts by the insurer to induce the in-
sured to contribute to the settlement; (3) failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the circumstances involved in the accident, which
would result in its inability to effectively weigh the evidence against
the insured; (4) the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney
or agent; (5) failure of the insurer to inform the insured of the com-
promise offer; (6) the amount of financial risk to which each party
is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; and (7) the fault of the
insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer
by misleading it as to the facts.'"
Although it has been held that the insurer has no duty to initiate settle-
ment negotiation,1 7 the fact that no offer was made within policy limits
is merely one factor to be considered in determining bad faith.' 8 "It has
been similarly established that an insurer's refusal to settle a case within
maximum policy limits . . . does not render the insurer liable per se to
its assured ..... " In view of the above considerations,2 ° perhaps the
insurer's best approach is to treat the settlement situation as though there
were no policy limits.'
North Carolina is in accord with the majority of states in holding the
insurer to a standard of good faith.2 Its statute provides: "The insur-
ance carrier shall have the right to settle any claim covered by the policy,
and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount thereof shall be
deductible from the limits. ,, 2" Prior to the passage of this statute, the
of fraud, negligence, and/or bad faith. . . ." Powell v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co.,
88 Ill. App. 2d 343, 348, 232 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1967).
1 Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83, 88-89 (D.N.J. 1967), quoting
from Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
17 Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963).
18 State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, - Tenn. - , 427 S.W.2d 30 (1968);
accord, Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 69 IIl. App. 2d 196, 216
N.E.2d 198 (1966).
10 Powell v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 88 Ill. App. 2d 343, 347-48, 232 N.E.2d
155, 158 (1967).
' The considerations mentioned are by no means intended to be an exhaustive
listing of all relevant factors. See generally 7A APPLEMAN §§ 4712-13; Keeton.
" Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
" Annot., supra note 9.
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (3) (1953). See Bradford v. Kelly, 260
N.C. 382, 132 S.E.2d 886 (1963). Consider also the impact of the UNIFORM COM-
M1ERCIAL CODE which states that "the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
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North Carolina Supreme Court had consistently followed the good faith
test -24 since its passage, the court has continued to follow it,25 although
on one occasion it specifically refused to decide whether the insurer was
liable for negligence.26 The most recent case dealing with North Caro-
lina's standard is Abernathy v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.27 In this
case the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a nonsuit in the dis-
trict court, and held that the mere refusal by the company to entertain
an offer of settlement before trial was sufficient to carry the case to the
jury on the issue of bad faith.28 The court pointed out that all cases have
at least a "nuisance" value and that the flat refusal to negotiate should
be considered by the jury. 9 The practical effect of this decision is to
give the insured a strong bargaining point in further negotiations with
the insurer, since it is common knowledge that juries favor those suing
insurance companies 20
In analyzing the case law, it becomes apparent that there are strong
arguments both for and against the trend"' towards a strict liability rule.
ableness and care prescribed by this chapter may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-102(3) (1965).
2Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946
(1917); accord, State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939).
"Henry v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.C. 1956); Bradford
v. Kelly, 260 N.C. 382, 132 S.E.2d 886 (1963); Alford v. Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C.
224, 103 S.E.2d 8 (1958).
2 Alford v. Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 224, 103 S.E.2d 8 (1958). The court
has stated, however, that the carrier, when wrongfully refusing to defend, is liable
only for a reasonable amount of the consent judgment in excess of limits. Nixon
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 106, 120 S.E.2d 430 (1961).27373 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1967).
2" This case is quite interesting on its facts. Insured held a policy with 30,000
dollars maximum limit. Insured's car ran into the rear of another car which
had previously hit a van in the rear. There were four fatalities and one serious
injury. The main issue was whether the second accident was the proximate cause
of any or all injuries sustained in the adverse party's car. Two wrongful death
actions were consolidated for trial and the jury returned a verdict for the insured
which was affirmed on appeal. Lawing v. Landis, 256 N.C. 677, 124 S.E.2d 877
(1962). The second suit was by the injured occupant, and the jury gave a 10,000
dollar verdict against the insured, which was also affirmed on appeal. Punch v.
Landis, 258 N.C. 114, 128 S.E.2d 224 (1962). This left 20,000 dollars in insurance
coverage. There was an offer to settle the last two wrongful death actions for
15,000 dollars. The company refused, and at the trial the injured passenger testi-
fied for the first time that he remembered all the occupants being alive after the
first wreck, a critical issue. The judge advised insured's attorney that he should
settle to which he replied that he did not have 50 dollars authority. 373 F.2d at
568.
29 373 F.2d at 569.
20 It should be pointed out that the case was eventually settled for a substantial
figure.
"'At least one federal judge interprets it as a new trend saying that "the
reasoning of the California Supreme Court seems to indicate a trend towards
requiring insurance companies to act more responsibly towards their customers
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The basic theme of the strict liability argument, as announced in Crisci,
is that the rule would "eliminate the danger that an insurer, faced with a
settlement offer at or near policy limits, will reject it and gamble with the
insured's money to further its own interests.""2 This argument is seem-
ingly answered, however, in the next sentence of the court's opinion where
it states that "it is not entirely clear that the proposed rule would place
a burden on insurers substantially greater than that which is present un-
der existing laws." 3 Surely the burden would not be substantially great-
er if the carrier were truly gambling with the insured's money, due to the
existing negligence and bad faith standards. But what of the notion that
"a mistake [of judgment], honestly made does not subject the person to
legal liability?" 4 Consider further the obvious change in the burden of
proof. Absent some affirmative defense such as fraud, an insured would
merely be required to prove the rejection of an offer that was within
policy limits. Proponents of a strict liability rule argue that it would be
simple to apply and would avoid determining whether the insurer's de-
cision was reasonable.35 This logic would obviate a function that juries
regularly perform in simple negligence cases. Perhaps the most attractive
argument of the proponents of strict liability is that "where insurer's and
insured's interest necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may reap the
benefit of its determination not to settle, should also suffer the detriments
of its decision '." 6 This argument apparently overlooks the fact that the
parties to the contract expressly bargained for limited, not absolute, liabil-
ity. Furthermore, the insurer is granted the right to control settlements. 37
Strict liability would make the insurer absolutely liable for the excess
though the company was exercising an express contractual right ;38 where-
with respect to offers of settlement." Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp.
83, 89 n.5 (D.N.J. 1967).
- 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
"Id.
"Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 271, 91 S.E.
946, 947 (1917).
" See 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (dictum).
T Id.
"It must be remembered that the insured's cause of action is normally based
on the alleged breach of an implied covenant found in this settlement control clause.
See Annot., supra note 9; Keeton.
" While it is true that the insurance contract is not truly an arms length
transaction, the insured is normally protected by his state legislature, which con-
dones this clause. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (3) (1953). As pointed
out by one writer, the full impact of the Crisci dicta is that it "holds out to liability
insureds the prospect that they will have the best of both worlds: absolute con-
tractual liability of the insurer, without necessity of proof other than rejection
of an offer within policy limits, plus liability for financial damage, mental suffer-
ing, and perhaps other items of damage." Levitt, The Crisci Case-Something
Old, Something New, 580 INs. L.J. 12, 18 (1968).
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as, the insured would be completely protected if the settlement offer had
been within policy limits.
An ancillary problem presented by the excess judgment cases is wheth-
er the injured party, either as a third party beneficiary or as an assignee
of the insured's rights, may sue the insurer. The great weight of au-
thority holds that the injured party is not a third party beneficiary and
may not sue for bad faith in a direct action,"8 although an exception has
been found in the case of compulsory insurance laws.4 ° The concept of
allowing the insured to assign his cause of action has received some
approval,4 for it allows the insured to effectuate a settlement of the ex-
cess that the company allegedly caused.42 A strong countervailing argu-
ment is that such assignments would breed collusion between the injured
person and the insured.43 It is not difficult to foresee settlement offers
being made within the policy limits solely to give rise to a bad faith ac-
tion, and this danger would be increased by a strict liability rule. Some
states effectively preclude such assignments by holding that the insured
must make payment on the excess judgment before he has a cause of
action against the insurer.44
Under present law the liability of the parties to the insurance con-
tract is often uncertain in the settlement situation. Perhaps the best
solution, suggested by at least one writer,46 is to include a provision in
the insurance policy to the effect that the liability of the insurer will be
double the original limits, should the insurer reject an offer that is within
those policy limits. Such a provision would not eliminate all excess
judgment actions. It would, however, tend to (1) minimize the risk that
"
9 See, e.g., Browdy v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 610, 289 N.Y.S.2d
711 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
' Id. While North Carolina has not passed upon this point, it should be noted
that the state does have compulsory liability insurance.
"E.g., Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1968).
Contra, Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592, 381 S.W.2d 914 (1964).
See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1967).
" Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1967).
"Id.
"Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d 727 (1935).
Contra, United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E2d
809 (1967). Any effect of this rule on the insured's cause of action has been
avoided by means of a declaratory judgment, but the holding still precludes an
assignment since the insured must still make some payment before he can sue the
insurer. Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968).
" For an article making recommendations to insurers on how to avoid this
situation, see Snyder, Defense in Excess of Policy Limit Litigation, 18 FED. or
INS. COUNSELORS 9 (1968); see also O'Brien, Liability Beyond the Policy Limit,
391 INs. L.J. 525 (1955).
6 Keeton 1183-85; see Georgia L. Ins. Co. v. Mississippi C.R. Co., 116 Miss.
114, 76 So. 646 (1917) (policy provided double coverage).
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the insurer will gamble with the insured's money, since rejection of an
offer within policy limits will expose the carrier to double liability, and
(2) would determine the outer limits of the insurer's liability, absent
actual bad faith. Such a provision would be more reasonable than court
imposition of strict liability, which would frequently impose liability for
exercising a contractual right, often one approved by the state legisla-
ture." Before such drastic action is taken, the legislature should give
its express sanction.
JAMES R. CARPENrER, JR.
Labor Law-Innocent Purchaser's Duty to Reinstate Employees
The NLRB, under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, has authority to issue a remedial order against an employer who
"has engaged in or is engaging in .. . unfair labor practice[s]."I The
exercise of this authority is unquestioned when the order is directed
against the guilty employer. If the guilty employer sells his business
before the unfair practice has been remedied, however, the Board must
decide whether the order may be directed against the purchaser. If the
purchaser is but a "disguised continuance" of the seller' or one who has
concerted with the guilty employer to evade the order,' the Board may
properly direct an order against the purchaser. When the purchase is
made in good faith, the problems are more acute. An examination of the
decisions reveals the Board's difficulties.
Initially, the Board recognized no limitation as to the parties who
could be bound by an order under Section 10(c) once an unfair labor
practice was discovered. In the 1948 decision of Alexander Milburn Co.,4
a purchaser, who was neither a "disguised continuance" nor an "evader,"
"I E.g., N.C. GEr. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (3) (1953).
1 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
If... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person . .. has engaged
in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board ... shall
issue ...an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay as will effectuate the policies of this
Act.
rd.
, Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); Southport Petro. Co. v.
NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
' Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); NLRB v. Ozark Hard-
wood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960).
'78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1948).
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was ordered to reinstate employees wrongfully discharged by his pre-
decessor. The Board, however, did recognize the policy favoring free
alienation as it limited the class of "innocent purchasers" upon whom
the order would be binding to those who were found to be "successors"
of the previous employers. A "successor" was defined as one who con-
tinued the seller's business operations in substantially unchanged form.
In Milburn, this was evidenced by the retention of the predecessor's em-
ployees and plant and by the manufacture of the same products.
Upon subsequent judicial examination, Section 10(c) was held not
to encompass an innocent purchaser. Two courts of appeals' reasoned
that the enforceability of a Board order was limited by Rule 65(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 concluding that an innocent pur-
chaser was not a "party to the action" under a statute applicable only to
those "engaged in or engaging in" unfair labor practices. The Board,
following this judicial mandate, overruled Milburn in Symns Grocer Co.,
In Perma Vinyl Corp.,9 the Board reversed its position again by
ordering a purchaser to reinstate employees discharged by the previous
owner in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act,", despite a
finding that the successor was a "bona fide purchaser."" United States
Pipe & Foundry Co. had purchased the assets of Perma Vinyl Corpora-
tion with knowledge of a pending unfair labor charge against Perma
Vinyl, and had continued the manufacture of plastic pipe in the same
manner with substantially the same work force. After the acquisition,
the Board issued an order requiring Perma Vinyl and "its successors
and assigns" to reinstate the employees. U.S. Pipe was served notice to
appear and show cause why it should not be charged as Perma Vinyl's
5 Id. at 748.
'NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Bird-
sall-Stockdale Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953).7 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) provides that
[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order . . . is
binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees .... and upon those persons in active concert or participation
with them ....
8 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954).
'164 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (May 24, 1967).
"
0National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3)
(1964). The Board found that Perma Vinyl had discharged three employees be-
cause of their affiliation with a labor union.
" 164 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (May 24, 1967). As employed in this context, "bona
fide purchaser" may be a misleading phrase. U.S. Pipe did have notice of the
NLRB proceeding and, therefore, is to be distinguished from a bona fide purchaser
in the law of real property who must take without notice. E.g., Companaro v.
Gondolfo, 60 F.2d 451, 452 (3rd Cir. 1932).
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successor with remedying the unfair practices. Following an adverse
ruling, U.S. Pipe petitioned the court to have the order set aside.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States Pipe and Found-
ry v. NLRB' affirmed the Board's decision. Finding support in the
Supreme Court decision of John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,3
which had bound a purchaser to his predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement, the court directed that the order be enforced on the succes-
sorship theory of Alexander Milburn Co. Seizing upon the language in
Wiley that "[t]he objectives of the national labor policy ... require that
the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their busi-
ness . . . be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden
change in the employment relationship,"' 4 the court concluded that "pur-
chasing with notice of the unfair labor proceedings and continuing the
same operation even to the jobs in question ... is . . . sufficient basis for
requiring it to offer reinstatement to the employees on the successorship
theory"' 5 of Alexander Millburn.
Although the Milburn reasoning was revived, the decision did not
fully resolve the difficulty with innocent purchaser liability, for the court
based its decision on policy considerations and never explicitly faced the
legal bar presented by the earlier courts of appeals decisions.' 6 U.S. Pipe
would constitute stronger precedent for future board rulings had these
contrary holdings been dealt with adequately.
There are two possible approaches that the court could have taken to
support its policy. As to the limitation posed by Federal Rule 65(d),
the court may be justified in considering U.S. Pipe a "party to the ac-
tion." In Symns Grocer Co.,' 7 which initially overruled Milburn, the
Board reasoned that the scope of their order was limited by Rule 65 (d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that a successor
employer, who had not acted with his predecessor to evade the charge
and who was not a disguised continuance, could not be reached by an
order under Section 10(c). The purpose of the limitations in Rule
65(d) apparently is to prevent unwitting contempt,'" and U.S. Pipe, in
the instant case, had notice of the NLRB proceedings against Perma
12398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968).
12376 U.S. 543 (1964).
1
'Id. at 549.
"United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir.
1968).
10 See note 6 supra.
17 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954).
"See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945).
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Vinyl and was given an opportunity to be heard. This circumstance,
added to the fact that the Board's orders are remedial rather than puni-
tive in nature, 9 appear to justify an order against such a "bona fide pur-
chaser."
An alternative approach would be for the Board to proceed directly
against U.S. Pipe as the guilty employer, which would preclude any
problem raised by Federal Rule 65(d). The Board has previously im-
posed only derivative responsibility in such cases,2 ° seemingly on the
ground that it was not the purchaser who committed the violation. This
approach, however, is inconsistent with the "evader" cases2' and seems
to belie the plain import of the language in Section 10(c), which provides
that the Board may issue an order against an employer who "has engaged
in or is engaging in . . . unfair labor practices." 22 An evader, unlike a
disguised continuance, is not the party that discharged the employees,
but one who, by his acts, has engaged in unfair labor practices. There-
fore, "engaging in unfair labor practices" may be construed to include not
only those persons committing the violation, but also employers who, by
their failure to afford a remedy, allow the harmful effects of a violation
to continue.
Assuming that a "bona fide purchaser" can be validly bound by a
Board order, there still remain policy restrictions on the exercise of this
authority. These restrictions, which are embodied in the successorship
theory, are seldom adequately articulated.
It is obvious that the purchaser must have the present capacity to
comply with the order. If reinstatement is to be required, the jobs must
still exist; the Board cannot order an employer to hire more men than
he needs or to employ a person for whom there is no work.2" This lim-
itation upon the Board's power is qualified to the extent that an em-
ployer may be required to discharge employees hired subsequent to the
violation to create openings for those ordered to be reinstated.24 Also,
the Board may require the employer to put the injured employees on a
preferential hiring list.25
" Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940) ; Frosty Morn Meats,
Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1961).
"
0NLRB v. Harris, 198 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
21 See note 3 supra.
22 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
2 2NLRB v. Lightener Pub. Corp., 128 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v.
Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1940).
"'NLRB v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1944);
NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941).2 NLRB v. J.G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1943).
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Notice before the purchase that there is an unfair labor practice
charge against the seller is a second element of the successorship theory.
U.S. Pipe and Alexander Milburn emphasized actual knowledge, and the
ruling in M. Yoseph Bag Co. 6 suggests that the Board will require such
notice. In M. Yoseph, the Board refused to order a remedy, although
the predecessor was an officer, director, and large stockholder in the pur-
chasing corporation. Since information of the charge is readily avail-
able, either by an inquiry to the union or to the NLRB itself, it would
not appear to be inequitable to bind a purchaser to constructive notice,
and future rulings may so hold.
The successorship theory may also require an affirmative showing
that the labor policy of the purchaser will be the same as that of the pre-
decessor-employer. The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act
is to lessen industrial strife,2 7 and to this end the Act protects the right
of employees to engage in union activities. 8 The most serious conse-
quence of a dismissal in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) is the
deterrence of these activities. 9 This deterrence was not alleviated by the
change in ownership in either U.S. Pipe or Alexander Milburn. In the
former, although there was a new owner, the president of Perma Vinyl
became U.S. Pipe's general manager; the old employer was still influenc-
ing the labor policy and the deterrence to unionization remained. In
Alexander Milburn the court was careful to note that the purchaser re-
tained his predecessor's plant manager and supervisory personnel. "Un-
der these circumstances, the employees had no reason to believe that the
labor policies of the successor were other than those of the predecessor."30
Therefore, the policy favoring the issuance of a remedial order is not
weakened by the change in ownership. A different situation unfolds if
there is a complete change in the employing enterprise before a remedy
has been effected. Although the new employer continues the same oper-
ation in the latter situation, an employee is not justified in believing that
there will still be discriminations in violation of the Act, for all ties bind-
ing the new labor policy with the old are broken. Under these circum-
stances, there is no deterrence of union activities and the policy favoring
the issuance of an order against the new owner is considerably weakened.
This suggests that the phrase often identified with the successorship
theory, "similarity and continuity of operations across the change of
20139 N.L.R.B. 310 (1962).
"'National Labor Relations Act § l(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964).
" National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
8 Ford Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 994, 1009 (1941).
" Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747, 750-51 (1948).
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ownership"" refers not so much to the making of the same products in
the same plant, but to an appearance to the employee of a continuation
of the old labor policy, which, in turn, frustrates the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
An innocent purchaser can now be required by the NLRB to remedy
the unfair labor practices of his predecessor under the successorship
theory. Although an unrestricted exercise of this authority may place
an unjust burden upon the purchaser, an examination of the contractual
options available to the purchaser indicates that innocent purchaser li-
ability, as limited by the successorship theory, is not manifestly unfair.
If the prospective buyer has notice of the unfair labor charge, as required
by U.S. Pipe, he can insulate himself from the hardships imposed by the
subsequent order either by negotiating for a reduced purchase price or
for an indemnity clause in the contract of sale. Admittedly, the innocent
purchaser cannot be relieved of all the burdens through contractual agree-
ment ;32 however, any remaining burden is negligible when contrasted to
the deleterious effects of an unremedied violation. In light of this con-
sideration, the court in U.S. Pipe properly balanced the equities.
JERRY W. LEONARD
Real Property-Mortgagee's Rights in Security
The California Supreme Court, in the recent decision of American
Savings & Loan Association v. Leeds,' imposed significant limitations
on a purchase money mortgagee's rights to his security. Contrary to the
situations in other states, the California mortgagee finds himself in an
increasingly precarious position. The Leeds decision not only increases
the mortgagee's risk, but also injects a degree of uncertainty into the law.
The plaintiff in Leeds was the beneficiary of a deed of trust given to
secure a debt defendant Leeds had incurred to purchase real estate from
defendants Sheridan. The Sheridans had falsely represented that the
house had been built on unfilled land and had also concealed defects
caused by subsidence due to improper filling. After the sale, when further
"United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir.
1968).2 For example, a stigma possibly attaches to an employer involved in an unfair
labor proceeding.
I Cal. 2d -, 440 P.2d 933, 68 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1968).
[Vol. 47
MORTGAGEE'S RIGHTS
subsidence rendered the property "worthless or of little or no value,"2
Leeds sued the Sheridans for the purchase price and settled the action
for an unknown amount. In its action, the mortgagee sought to recover
general and punitive damages from the Sheridans, to hold Leeds liable
for its loss on the theory that his failure to keep the property in repair
destroyed its security, and to impose a trust on the amount Leeds had re-
covered from the Sheridans. Leeds demurred, and the court dismissed
the complaint against him.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that covenants by Leeds in the deed
of trust to "keep said property in good condition and repair . . . [and]
to complete or restore promptly and in good condition and workmanlike
manner any building which may be constructed, damaged, or destroyed
thereon,"' and to assign to the plaintiff "[a] ny award of damages in con-
nection with any condemnation for public use or injury to said prop-
erty . . ."' entitled him to recover.
In ruling on the second quoted covenant, the court held that the set-
tlement that Leeds had received in the prior suit was not for injury to
the property, but for the "fraudulent or negligent wrong in inducing de-
fendant to purchase the property."5 For that reason, the money could
not be regarded as a substitute for the injured property. By differentiat-
ing between recoveries for injury to land and for fraudulent representa-
tions about land, the court apparently intended to distinguish the situa-
tion in Leeds from that in Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank v. Borten-
stein." There defendant's mortgaged land was flooded due to negligence
on the part of the city, and defendant had recovered damages from the
city. Plaintiff-mortgagee was allowed to share in the recovery to the
extent of the mortgage as if the city had taken the land for public use.
The money, according to the court, had taken the place of the land, and
defendant had taken possession of the money subject to the plaintiff's
security.
In Leeds the court, while denying that the money collected by Leeds
"takes the place of the land," stated that if the Sheridans had paid Leeds
the full purchase price in the settlement, the plaintiff could impose a
constructive trust to the extent of its security in the premises. Since the
plaintiff was unable to plead the amount that Leeds had received in the
settlement, it was held to have failed to state a cause of action.
2Id. at -, 440 P.2d at 935, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
8Id.
'Id.
Id. at - , 440 P.2d at 937, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 457.847 Cal. App. 421, 190 P. 850 (1920).
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The result that the court would have reached had the full purchase
price been paid would apparently be grounded on general constructive
trust principles,' and not because the court regarded the money as a
substitute for the land merely because the entire purchase price had been
refunded. The court reasoned that in that situation the Sheridans would
have intended a complete settlement for all liability and that Leeds thus
is presumed to have mistakenly taken money which belongs to the plain-
tiff. But it is unclear why a constructive trust should be imposed if Leeds
collected the whole amount to which he and the plaintiff were entitled, but
not if he collected less than that amount, but more than that to which
he himself was entitled. Furthermore, damages for fraud would be mea-
sured by subtracting the actual value of the property at the time of con-
veyance from the price paid.8 Given this measure, it may be accurate to
say that the recovery did not "take the place of the land" for remedial
purposes, but still the settlement may have been for more than Leeds'
damages, especially since the damages he prayed for in the prior suit
equalled exactly the purchase price paid to the Sheridans. With this
possibility, why must the plaintiff plead the exact amount Leeds received,
rather than being allowed to take advantage of discovery mechanisms to
ascertain the amount of that recovery?' The court says little to solve
these problems.'
As to the first covenant to restore damaged property, the court found
that even if it could be interpreted to obligate Leeds to correct the fill,
the state's anti-deficiency judgment statute, section 580b of the CALI-
FORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE," would prohibit such an effect. By
I The court cited RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1936), which outlines
the general nature of the constructive trust remedy.
' CAL. CIV. CODE § 3343 (West 1954).
'The plaintiff might have escaped this dilemma by pleading on information and
belief that the defendant had received the entire purchase price, thereafter using
discovery procedures and amending its complaint accordingly. The complaint was
dismissed without leave to amend, however.
"
0 Justice Mosk, dissenting, criticized the majority for its inattention to these
problems, and for "hinting" that a future action may lie, while not allowing a
determination in the case before them.
" CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 580b (West Supp. 1967). This section provides'
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property
for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed
of trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance
of the purchase price of real property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgae
,
on a dwelling for not inore than four families given to a lender to secure
repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all of or part of the pur-
chase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in part by the purchaser.
Italicized portions were adopted by amendment [1963] Cal. Stat., ch. 2158, § 1.
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so ruling, the court applied the statute to a situation markedly different
from that in which such statutes are normally applied.
A "deficiency judgment" has been traditionally defined by the courts
as "that part of a debt which a mortgage was given to secure and [which
is] not realized from the sale of mortgaged property."' 2  California's
anti-deficiency statute has been interpreted to give broad protection to
purchasers of real estate. It was originally enacted in 1933,'3 and was
later modified to prohibit a deficiency judgment "after any sale of real
property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale ... 2 4
The California courts (before the amendment that specifically so pro-
vided) construed the statute, contrary to other court's interpretations,' 5
to cover money advanced to the purchaser by persons other than the
vendor.' It has been held that when a grantee of a purchase money
mortgagor assumes the debt he is entitled to the protection of section
580b." The court has also found that a purchase money mortgagor is
protected by the statute from the claims of a holder of a second purchase
money deed of trust, even though the security was exhausted in a sale
by the holder of the first trust deed.'
8
The court has stated that the purpose of the statute is to insure that
"for a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust, the security alone can
be looked to for recovery of the debt," 9 and thus to put on the lender
the risk that the security may be inadequate at the time of default. An
attempt was subsequently made to ascertain the purposes that the stat-
ute was designed to achieve. ° The court discussed and rejected the
possibility that the statute was intended to prevent a creditor from pur-
chasing the mortgaged premises for less than their true value at a forced
sale and thereafter obtaining a large deficiency judgment. Other sections
12 Harrow v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 285 Mich. 349, 353, 280 N.W. 785
787 (1938).
13 [1933] Cal. Stat., ch. 642, § 5.
[1935] Cal. Stat., ch. 680, § 1.
See Currie & Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A
Study in Conflict of Laws Method, 1960 DuKE L.J. 1, 17-18.
1" Bargioni v. Hill, 59 Cal. 2d 121, 378 P.2d 593, 28 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1963).
"7 Stockton Say. & Loan Bank v. Massanet, 18 Cal. 2d 200, 114- P.2d 592
(1941).
18 Brown v. Jenson, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953). Contra, Sivade v.
Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 528, 146 A. 364 (1929). In Gates v. Schuster, 227 Cal. App.
409, 38 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1964), a plaintiff who had sold both real and personal
property and accepted cash and a promissory note secured by a trust deed on the
real property only was held to have contracted to forego further security, and was
therefore unable to obtain a deficiency judgment on the personalty.
10 Brown v. Jenson, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 198, 259 P.2d 425, 427 (1953).
30 Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963).
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of the California Code2' limit a deficiency judgment under any mortgage
to the difference between the amount of the obligation and the fair mar-
ket 'value of the property sold. Hence, a mortgagor is protected from
a deficiency judgment following a low auction bid if the fair market value
is equal to or greater than the mortgage debt. The court felt, therefore,
that if section 580b is not merely redundant, it must have been intended
to protect purchase money mortgagors, whether the mortgagee be the
vendor or a third party, from deficiency judgments even when the fair
market value of the land is not as great as the mortgage debt. Also re-
jected as the basis for the statute was the assertion that the lender knows
more about the property being sold than the buyer.
Three considerations have been accepted as underlying the statute's
stated goal:' (1) to discourage the vendor's overvaluing the land; (2)
to discourage speculative land promotions; and (3) to prevent the ag-
gravation of an economic depression that might result from the pur-
chaser's losing both the land and the amount of the judgment. The Leeds
decision may be evaluated in light of its tendency to further these three
ends. The first goal is not relevant in Leeds because the plaintiff there
was not the vendor. The Leeds decision might tend to further the sec-
ond goal of braking speculative land sales by forcing potential third
party lenders to investigate the value of the premises offered as security
before extending loans. The third goal, offsetting deflationary tendencies
in the economy, is acknowledged to be the primary objective. The Leeds
case did not involve the most obvious way depressions could be accelerated
by deficiency judgments because, unlike the normal deficiency judgment
action, there was no possibility of the defendant's losing both the land
and part of his other assets.
In ascertaining whether the Leeds decision could operate to lessen
the severity of a depression in some other way, there are two approaches
that might be read into the opinion. It could be contended that the court
held (1) that the plaintiff must bear the risk that the security was dam-
aged at the time of sale only, or (2) that if the security becomes inade-
quate at any time, for any reason, plaintiff must bear the burden. The
relevant language is:
Even if defendant's agreement to "keep said property in good con-
dition and repair" and to "restore... any building which may be...
damaged or destroyed thereon" could reasonably be interpreted to
21 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§ 580a, 726 (West 1955).
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963).
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include an obligation to correct the improper fill condition and repair
all physical damage caused thereby, section 580b of the Code of Civil
Procedure would preclude giving effect to that interpretation ....
To require defendant to correct the condition of the property existing
at the time of sale ... would shift to him one of the risks that section
580b requires plaintiff to bear.2 3
The second interpretation might open the possibility of exhaustion of the
security by a dishonest or negligent mortgagor, with no recourse for the
lender. Both the court's choice of language ("condition . ..existing at
the time of sale") and the background of the decision make it unlikely
that this was the intended meaning.2
If the court's interpretation passed the risk of inadequate security
at the time of sale only to the vendor, the decision has no affect on the
severity of depressions. If offsetting deflationary tendencies is the only
legitimate purpose of section 580b," the statute would apply only when
the fair market value of the premises had fallen below the amount
of the mortgage debt because of declining land values. The plaintiff urged
that fighting such a snowball effect of declining land prices is the sole
aim of the statute, and that the risk placed on the lender was of an eco-
nomic nature caused by price fluctuation." But the court, by its ruling,
extended the disabling effect of the statute to those lenders who find the
value of the premises to be below the amount of the debt because they
took inadequate security originally, and implicitly held that the statute
had purposes other than "cycle-leveling." The Leeds decision may rest
on the goal of discouraging speculation or on purposes not previously
enumerated by the court.
By apparently refusing to limit section 580b's purpose to "cycle-
leveling," and by speaking of "the risks that section 580b requires plain-
tiff to bear"2 7 without explicitly stating what those risks are, the court
has left the mortgagee's rights and contract options open to question. It
is certain that the mortgagee cannot protect himself from the risk that
the security is inadequate at the time the mortgage is made, regardless of
the cause of the inadequacy. Probably, the validity of a promise by a
" - Cal. 2d at -, 440 P.2d at 937, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 457 (citation omitted).
"Easton v. Ash, 18 Cal. 2d 530, 116 P.2d 433 (1941), held that the mort-
gagor's right to sue for waste remains intact. There is dicta to that effect in Wea-
ver v. Bay, 216 Cal. App. 732, 31 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1963).
" Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New Judicial
Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1963), suggests that "cycle-leveling" should be
the sole purpose.
"
0 Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Petition for Hearing by Supreme Court at
8, - Cal. 2d - , 440 P.2d 933, 68 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1968).
2 Cal. 2d at - , 440 P.2d at 937, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
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mortgagor not to impair the security is not affected by the Leeds decision.
In Mills v. Brown,2" a provision in a chattel mortgage on sheep whereby
the mortgagor promised not to sell the sheep, their increase, or their wool
was held to authorize a suit against the mortgagor for conversion, not-
withstanding a statutory provision29 limiting a mortgagee to one action
to recover the debt or to enforce a right secured by the mortgage. The
court found that the action was not one covered by the statute, but one to
prevent impairment of the security given. This would seem analagous
to an action for impairment of security by a mortgagor-occupier that is
challenged by section 580b.30 Moreover, the court has not in the past
forbidden the mortgagee's contracting for further security on the same
debt. 1 The validity of a promise by a mortgagor to repair damages due
to the actions of third parties or natural catastrophies, which might be
regarded as "further security," is, nevertheless, put into question by the
Leeds decisionY The court did point out that Leeds involved an un-
usual situation where the damage had occurred before the transfer of the
land. Also, in suggesting remedies that the mortgagee may still retain,
the court included waste, suits against third parties for tortiously dam-
aging the security, and rights in eminent domain proceedings, but made
no mention of covenants to repair damage not caused by the mortgagor.
There is nothing in the opinion to indicate whether such damage is in-
cluded in the risks that section 580b puts on the lender, and the validity
of such covenants by the mortgagor should be at least suspect.
Summarizing briefly, it was held by the court that the covenant by
Leeds to assign "[a]ny award of damages" did not entitle plaintiff to a
constructive trust in the proceeds of the settlement, the recovery not being
for injury to land. The court further held that to interpret the covenant
to "keep such property in good condition and repair" as imposing upon
Leeds the duty to correct the fill would pass to him one of the risks sec-
tion 580b requires the lender to bear. This decision has been evaluated
in light of the three previously accepted reasons for the statute's policy.
In assessing the effects of the decision on the primary goal, preventing
depression, it is unlikely the court intended to require the mortgagee to
28205 Cal. 38, 269 P. 636 (1928).
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 726 (West 1955).8 0The dissenter found Mills applicable, - Cal. 2d at - , 440 P.2d at 938,
68 Cal. Rptr. at 458, and presumably felt that the analogy between realty and per-
sonalty was valid.
"
1Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. 2d 180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942).
2 The court, in a footnote, - Cal. 2d at - , 440 P.2d at 936 n.2, 68 Cal.
Rptr. at 456 n.2, did distinguish this case from those in which the damage was
inflicted after the mortgage.
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bear the burden of the security's becoming inadequate at any time for
any reason. Since placing the risk of inadequate security at the time of
sale on the mortgagee would not further the anti-depression goal, the
court may have found purposes for section 580b not articulated in prior
decisions. While it is possible to draw some conclusions about the ef-
fects of the decision on the mortgagee's position, it is not possible to say
whether a provision making mortgagors responsible for damage to the
security from third parties or natural calamity would be valid.
An authority on the law of mortgages has observed that "[i]n all
legal systems there seems to be in the law of mortgages an evolution from
a forfeit-idea in which the res is given as conditional satisfaction of some
act for which there is no personal duty (at least not one for which there
is a direct action) to a security idea."33 This evolution has been due
mainly to the skill of drafters of mortgages and other security agreements
who, typically, are the lenders or their representatives. The California
court's treatment of the anti-deficiency judgment statute has reversed the
trend. The mortgaged real estate is no longer simply a convenient method
for the lender to collect what is owed him, but a device for limiting the
borrower's liability in loan transactions involving the sale of real estate.
The facts that in the typical mortgage the lender is a professional and
the borrowed an amateur, that the lender often is in the better bargaining
position, and that the market is sometimes lacking in competitiveness
may have influenced the reasoning that brought the court to this position.
It is the court's view that these considerations influenced the legislature
in enacting the statute. But the presence or absence of these facts in the
individual case is now irrelevant, the determination having been made in
advance for the whole class of such cases in favor of the borrower.
Thus, California has again given special encouragement to buyers of
land, and in doing so has apparently revived an earlier view of the mort-
gage relation.
STEPHEN MASON THOMAS
Torts-A Clarification of the Actual Malice Test
In a recent libel case, St. Amant v. Thompson,1 a majority of the
Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified, but declined to expand, the "reck-
G. OSBORNE, MOJGAGES, § 13, at 31 (1951).
390 U.S. 727 (1968), rev'g 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967).
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less disregard" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' In New
York Times the Court, stating that the first and fourteenth amendments
afford a qualified privilege to the maker of certain libelous misstatements
of fact,' held that a false statement of fact relating to the official conduct
of public officials is not actionable unless it is made with "actual malice-
that is knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."' The Court in St. Amant refined this vague actual
malice doctrine and formulated distinct guidelines to help determine the
evidentiary criteria constitutionally necessary to support a finding that
a publication was made with actual malice.'
New York Times established two methods by which the evidentiary
requirements of the actual malice test could be satisfied." The first, ac-
tual knowledge, is easily applied.7 But the application of the second
method-showing reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a state-
ment-is more difficult. The first effort to clarify the New York Times
"actual malice" standard occurred in Garrison v. Louisiana,8 where the
Court expressly rejected the common law test of "ill will."" Requiring a
"high degree of awareness"'10 of the probable falsity of a statement, the
Court defined actual malice basically in terms of scienter" and stated
that mere negligence or unreasonableness in making a false statement will
2376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'The Court expressly adopted the view of the minority of state courts. 376
U.S. at 280-81. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312
P.2d 150 (1957); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Annot.,
150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
'376 U.S. at 279-80. An interesting part of the New York Times decision,
the "public official" doctrine, is beyond the scope of this note. For examples, see
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th
Cir. 1965); Fignole v. Curtis Publ. Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Comment, Constitutional Law-Defamation--Privilege to Comment on Official
Condiuct Extended, 46 BosT. U.L. REv. 568 (1966); Comment, Defamation of a
Public Official, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 356 (1967). For a discussion of the
extension of the public official concept to the "public figure," see Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Afro-American Publ. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Anendnment, 55; GEo.
L.J. 234 (1966); Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-
Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE L.J. 642 (1966).
'390 U.S. at 728.
a 376 U.S. at 279-80.
' See Fox v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563, 221 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935
(1966).
'379 U.S. 64 (1964).
'Id. at 72.
'ld. at 74.
" See Hanson, Developments in the Law of Libel: Impact of the New York
Times Rule, 7 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 215 (1966).
ACTUAL MALICE TEST
not support a slander action by a public official. Nor will evidence of
personal malice, or evidence that the misstatements affected the of-
ficial's private reputation support it.'2 The holding in Garrison suggests
that the defendant had a "general intent to make a false comment."' 3
Following New York Times and Garrison, numerous state and fed-
eral courts attempted to interpret the constitutional standard of reckless
disregard. Lower court holdings generally used either the amount of the
defendant's investigation of the source of his information or the inher-
ently improbable nature of the information itself14 as determinative. A
conflict arose as to whether evidence of the defendant's investigation of
his source was decisive. For example, the Third Circuit held that "inves-
tigatory failures are insufficient to show recklessness on the part of a news-
paper."' 5 However, the Seventh Circuit held there was sufficient evidence
to go to the jury on the question of reckless disregard where defendant
magazine published an article, based on the Civil Rights Commission Re-
port, stating that the plaintiff was brutal to Negroes, when in fact the
report only indicated it had been alleged.' 6 The inherently improbable
character of the libelous information was a determinative factor in other
attempted definitions of reckless disregard. Motive to injure alone, that
is, that the remark was incited by a prior grudge' or a desire to defeat
a candidate,'8 was held not to constitute reckless disregard.
In St. Amant, the defendant in a televised political campaign ad-
dress had charged the plaintiff with criminal conduct. Although the de-
fendant failed to investigate the reliability of his charges, which were
false, the Court held that the plaintiff had not satisfied his burden of
proving that the statements were made with a "reckless disregard" for
the truth.'" The decision specifies that the fact finder must determine
whether the publication was "indeed made in good faith."2 To satisfy
constitutional requirements, the evidence must be sufficient "to permit the
12 379 U.S. at 73, 76-77.
"
8Note, Constitutional Law--Freedom of Speech-Defaimation, 39 TuL. L.
REv. 355, 360 n.38 (1965).
14 See Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., 389 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1967).
' Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1968).
10 Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909
(1966). For other examples in which investigation was important, see Ross v.
News-Journal Co., - Del. - , 228 A.2d 531 (1967); Silbowitz v. Lepper, 55
Misc. 2d 443, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1967).1 Manbeck v. Ostrowiski, 384 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
10 Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150 (1957). The
court applied a standard similar to that in New York Times before that decision
was announced.10 390 U.S. at 728.20Id. at 732.
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conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice."'" The
Court further pointed out that not every uncontradicted assertion of good
faith will guarantee a verdict for the defendant.'
Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for ex-
ample, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of
his imagination or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous tele-
phone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher's
allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man
would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be
found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports.23
The first two illustrations in the quoted passage indicate that if the
defamatory publication has no source-neither an informant nor a fact
situation of which the defendant has personal knowledge-a jury will be
permitted to find reckless disregard. The Court implies that allegations
by the plaintiff must be countered with positive evidence by the defendant
that the statement was not a product of his imagination nor from a totally
unknown and unverified source. If the source of the alleged defamation
lies in some factual occurrence, the plaintiff then appears to have the
burden of showing that only a reckless man would draw and publish such
deductions from the situation, or that the defendant possessed knowledge
sufficient to make his inference either recklessly or knowingly false. In
other words, the deductions must be so improbable that the jury will be
permitted to find by implication the scienter required by Garrison. If the
defendant shows that the information came from an informant, the burden
again shifts to the plaintiff. He must show either that there are obvious
reasons for doubting the veracity of the informant, for example, by the
reporter's past record of reliability,24 or that the statements themselves
are so "inherently improbable" that only a reckless man would publish
them. St. Amant implies that this inherent improbability may be estab-
lished in either of two ways: the plaintiff must establish that knowledge
contrary to the alleged defamation is so widely held that only a reckless
man could publish it or that the defendant himself possessed facts from
which the jury could find scienter.
2 Id. at 731 (emphasis added).221d. at 732.
231d.
2 See Washington Post Co. v. Koegh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
25 390 U.S. at 732.
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The Court's treatment of the evidence in St. Amant suggests that the
emphasis by lower courts on the importance of investigation was mis-
placed, for evidence of investigation and of the nature of the defendant's
statements are no longer the primary determinants of the standard of
reckless disregard. These factors now seem to be of significance only as
evidence tending to show the defendant's doubt as a matter of fact. It
further seems that by allowing a factual determination of doubt to be
inferred from the evidence, the Court is possibly retreating from the New
York Times requirement of proof of reckless disregard with "convincing
clarity."2
St. Amant establishes some needed guidelines by its examples in which
the Court recognizes that reckless disregard may be inferred from the
facts. But the catch-all of "inherent improbability" that follows the ex-
amples leaves the test of reckless disregard a still uncertain concept. The
Court in effect replaces the illusive reckless disregard standard with a
new label-inherent improbability. It admits that the standard of reck-
less disregard "cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition.
' 27
Despite these lingering uncertainties, the Court rejects the absolutist
standard of Justices Black and Douglas," proving many of the early
commentators and speculators wrong2 9 The actual malice standard was
initially established in New York Times by balancing opposing societal
interests. The Court continues to recognize that although there is "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"" there still remains
a "pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation."" The Court has apparently decided that in relation to
public issues the actual malice prerequisite retains a constitutionally ade-
quate measure of protection for reputation and good name. There is
little reason to expect sweeping changes in this field in the near future.
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
20 376 U.S. at 286.
", 390 U.S. at 730.
" See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1964) (concurring opinions).
20 See Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234
(1966); Note, Criminal Law-Criminal Libel-Constitutional Limitations on
State Action, 14 Amt. U.L. REv. 220 (1965); Note, The New York Times Rule
and Society's Interest in Providing a Redress for Defamatory Statements, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 424 (1967); Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-
Defamation, 39 TUL. L. REv. 355 (1965); Note, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
-(84 S. Ct. 710)-The Scope of a Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 106 (1965).
"0 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
" Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
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